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This paper presents a theory of international taxation based on a new
approach to source taxation that reflects world development and synthesizes
the objectives of economic efficiency, fairness to taxpayers, and fairness to
governments. Adoption of this model results in the preservation of com-
prehensive income taxation to capital-exporting nations and an expenditure
tax base for capital-importing nations. The system would reduce much of
the distortion caused by tax competition, eliminating the tax incentive for
businesses to use productive assets and technologies outside the country of
their development and saving the jobs of many workers.
I. INTRODUCTION
International tax law today reflects a consensus reached seventy years
ago by the international community as to the appropriate divisions of the
income tax base among nations. Assuming two independent and mutually
exclusive jurisdictional bases for taxation, source and residence, conflict
between nations was resolved by establishing that source taxation was pri-
mary. As a consequence, residence taxation would unilaterally defer to
source.
* Professor of Law, The Dickinson School of Law of the Pennsylvania State University;
Visiting Professor of Law, The London School of Economics and Political Science; Senior
Associate Research Fellow, The Institute of Advanced Legal Studies (University of Lon-
don). This paper is the outgrowth of my presentation "Is Tax Competition Harmful?" which
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This resolution failed to reflect the force of economic principles and
equity among nations. The economic tax constructs that foster the eco-
nomically efficient allocation of capital in the world are Capital Export
Neutrality ("CEN") and Capital Import Neutrality ("CIN"). Contrary to
traditional wisdom, when one examines the underlying purposes and goals
of these doctrines, it can be shown that these doctrines are not incompatible,
but are harmonious parts of an optimal economic approach to international
taxation. The strength of these economic forces can be seen in how present
day nations are moving away from traditional source taxation of capital in-
come.
While economic efficiency allows for several compatible tax options,
equity among nations and among taxpayers establishes one optimal ap-
proach to the division of the tax base internationally. Equity establishes
that each nation has the right to tax the income that is produced in accor-
dance with the value that the nation has added to the world. This follows
the principles of CIN establishing exclusive source taxation, but source
taxation reinterpreted in accordance with the principle that it is not the place
where capital and assets are used that merits the tax, but the place that pro-
vided the environment for the creation of that property. This means that the
normal return on all capital, debt, equity, intangible assets and tangible as-
sets, is sourced to the country from which it came.
What remains for traditional source or territorial taxation is the income
in excess of the normal return on capital, "economic rent." Territorial taxa-
tion of economic rent should exclusively belong to the capital-importing na-
tion because that nation has provided the system responsible for the creation
of the economic rent.
What is left for the capital-importing nation after the normal return on
capital is allocated to the capital-exporting nation is consumption. Thus,
traditional source taxation of business can be implemented by a broad-
based expenditure tax. Traditional resident taxation is restricted to world-
wide taxation of the normal return on capital.
Under these optimal tax principles, the effects of tax competition are
minimized because the tax base on capital in all of its forms does not shift
when capital is mobile. Low taxation of the returns from assets and tech-
nologies by capital importing nations would then no longer influence the
decision to locate abroad.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The World Economy
Spurred by technological advances and the elimination of international
barriers to capital flows and trade,' there is a clear trend toward even greater
'VITO TANZI, TAXATION IN AN INTEGRATING WORLD ii (The Brookings Institution 1995).
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economic integration among nations. To gain an understanding of present
conditions, one must examine the role of capital, trade and other factor
movements, and transnational corporations.
The world is quickly embracing the benefits of free trade. Trade in-
creases competition, spawning production efficiencies, technological inno-
vations, and cheaper prices for consumers . It has been remarked that "the
more different ... the standards and costs of the world's trading partners,
the greater ... [the] nation's gains from trading with them.",
3
The growth in world trade has been phenomenal. Since 1959, world
trade has grown at a rate greater than 10% per year, as compared with the
Gross Domestic Product (GDP), which has grown at less than 4% per year.
In the United States, trade has grown at a rate of over 6% per year, as com-
pared with the GDP, which has grown at a rate of less than 4% per year
over the same time period.5 By 1990, merchandise exports had grown to
7.1% of the GDP in the United States, and merchandise imports had grown
to 9% of the GDP.6
Exports and imports only account for part of the story. International
capital flows are critical components of the world economic scene. The
free movement of capital helps its owners and users alike. Capital move-
ments help savers diversify their investments and may also increase rates of
returns. Capital movement also aids recipient countries in providing them
with a source of capital that may be cheaper than domestic supplies.
Thus, the role of the private investor is taking on a heightened status.
Indeed, Foreign Portfolio Investment ("FPI") is greater than Foreign Direct
Investment ("FDI"). 7 FPI can be defined as all private, non-FDI invest-
ments made by nonresidents. FDI is foreign investment undertaken by an
association, enterprise, or individual where the investor owns 10% or more
of the equity in the activity conducted.'
Over the years, worldwide portfolio flows have ranged from one and
one-half to three times the amount of FDI.9 It has been estimated that as of
2 GARY BURTLESS, ROBERT Z. LAWRENCE, ROBERT E. LITAN, & ROBERT J. SHAPIRO,
GLOBAPHOBIA, CONFRONTING FEARS ABOUT OPEN TRADE 20-23 (The Brookings Institution
1998).
31 Id. at93.
4 Id. at 22.
5 Id.
6 GARY C. HUFBAUER, UNITED STATES TAXATION OF INTERNATIONAL INCOME: BLUEPRINT
FOR REFORM 6 (Institute For International Economics 1992).
'See id. at 63.
'Id. at 63 n.I.
9See STEPHANY GRIFFITH-JONES, GLOBAL CAPITAL FLOWS: SHOULD THEY BE
REGULATED? 26 (MacMillan 1998).
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1995, the total United States outbound FPI was $1,300 billion and the total
United States inbound FPI was $1,950 billion. °
It is not simply the amount of foreign invested capital that defines the
modem economic order, but the mobility of capital flows and its changing
patterns. Much of FPI is short-term investment.1 It is simply astounding
to reflect on the sheer volume of financial transactions.
Statisticians have estimated that the ratio of the annual value of finan-
cial transactions 2 to the Gross National Product ("GNP") in three countries
with the largest financial markets grew dramatically and systematically: the
growth was from less than 10% in 1970 to more than 75% in 1990 for the
United States; from approximately 10% in 1970 to more than 110% in Ja-
pan; and from approximately 10% in 1970 to more than 40% in the United
Kingdom. 13 Total net world flows of capital were estimated at $1174.7 bil-
lion in 1993.14 Of the 1993 world flows of capital, $672 billion was attrib-
utable to portfolio inflows.' 5 By comparison, the 1993 level was 500% of
the 1987 level.
16
In addition to the increase of FPI, the mobility of business capital
("FDI") has increased. Net worldwide FDI was $162.1, $200.7, 212.5, and
316.4 billion in 1992, 1993, 1994, and 1995, respectively. 17 Statistics for
1990 indicate that United States outbound FDI increased more than 13
times from $32 billion in 1960 to $421 billion in 1990.18 Inbound FDI in
the United States increased approximately fifty-eight times from $7 billion
in 1960 to $404 billion in 1990.'9
However, the exploitation of FDI is quite different from the exploita-
tion of FPI. Businesses need to exploit their competitive advantage by in-
vesting in other countries. This may include the more efficient use of
technology and other intangible assets of a business. Oftentimes, a foreign
presence is warranted in order to acquire another's technology and exper-
tise.
This is a world of relatively free movement of the factors of production
including assets, capital, labor and technologies. Thus, the notion that only
trade exploits the competitive advantage of nations is less true today be-
cause many elements of the competitive advantage of a nation or business
10 HUFBAUER, supra note 6, at 72-75.
"GRIFFITH-JONES, supra note 9, at 26, 30, 33.
1 Financial transactions are measured as payments through the main interbank fund trans-
fer system.




,7 Id. at 29.
S See HUFBAUER, supra note 6, at 4.
19Id.
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are highly mobile. Business is constantly reassessing the merits of any par-
ticular nation as a location for business activities that utilize mobile factors
of production.
Transnational business enterprises 20 ("TNCs") increasingly dominate
international business activity. According to estimates, there were 44,000
TNCs with 280,000 foreign affiliates in 1996.21 TNCs' share of world out-
put has increased from 4.5% in 1970 to 7.5% in 1995.22 To gain some ap-
preciation for the size of some of these enterprises, General Motors' net
sales exceed the GDP of Poland, Ford Motor's net sales exceed the GDP of
South Africa, Exxon's net sales23 exceed the GDP of Malaysia, and Toy-
ota's net sales exceed the GDP of the Philippines.24 Indeed, the activities of
TNCs may be more important than imports and exports. By example, sales
of goods and services of United States foreign affiliates now exceed the to-
tal United States exports of goods and services. 25 Recent estimates indi-
cated that sales of United States foreign affiliates in 1995 were $2.1 trillion
as opposed to $794 billion in United States exports.26 Additionally, sales of
foreign-owned United States affiliates were $1.5 trillion as opposed to
$896.5 billion in United States imports.
27
B. The Effect of Globalization on Taxation
The increasing pace of globalization has resulted in developed nations'
increased concern over effects of globalization on their tax systems and
over income tax, in particular. Due to the increasing mobility of capital,
economic activity, financial services, and skilled labor, many developed na-
tions see certain tax practices of other countries as unfairly attracting the
economic activity that would otherwise have taken place within developed
countries, causing an erosion "of the tax base of these countries and distort-
ing the location of such economic activity." 28 Such practices can also cause
undesired shifts of part of the tax burden to less mobile tax bases, such as
consumption, labor, property, and increased administrative costs and com-
pliance burdens on tax authorities and taxpayers. Larger taxes on labor in-
crease the cost of labor, leading to lower wages or higher unemployment.
20 Transnational business enterprises are often called Multinational Corporations (MNC)
or Multinational Enterprises (MNE).
"I JOSEPH P. QUINLAN & KATHRYN STEVENS, 101 TRENDS EVERY INVESTOR SHOULD
KNOW ABOUT THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 20-21 (Lincolnwood, Contemporary Books 1998).
22Id. at 20.
" The statistics for Exxon reflect the status prior to Exxon's merger with Mobil Oil.
24 QUINLAN & STEVENS, supra note 21, at 20.
25 Id. at 20-21.
261 d. at 66.
27 Id.
28 Towards Global Tax Cooperation: Report of the 2000 Ministerial Council Meeting and
Recommendations by the Committee on Fiscal Affairs 5 (OECD 2000).
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However one views the propriety of this phenomenon, evidence
strongly supports this trend. 29 Data illustrates that the overall level of in-
come taxation in the world has declined.3 °
Even though corporate tax rates generally have declined among devel-
oped countries; the ratio of tax revenue to the GDP has not declined.32
This balance has been the experience of European Union ("EU") members,
but in the case of the United States and Canada, corporate tax revenues have
decreased by 15% to 20%. 33 United States corporate revenues decreased
from 3.9% of the GDP to 3% of the GDP over the period of 1960 to 1996.
34
By contrast, most developed countries have experienced an increase in the
percentage of consumption and employment taxes.35 OECD studies indi-
cated a dramatic upsurge in personal taxation over a thirty-year period.
Revenues from personal income tax in the United States rose from 6.8% to
12.3% of the GDP from 1960 to 1996.36
For example, 1998 data revealed that income tax and Social Security
contributions represent over 40% of wages in Germany and Belgium, and
approximately 26% of wages in France, the United Kingdom and the
United States.37 Employee, income, and Social Security taxes represent ap-
proximately 50% of the labor cost in several of the most developed EU
countries 38 and approximately 30% in the United Kingdom, Canada and the
United States
39
According to Professor Angelo Cardoni,4 ° "the average increase in tax
rates on labor in the last 15 years was in the order of ten percentage points.
The reverse applies to the taxation of other factors of production, mainly
" Indeed, one recent work in favor of "tax competition" outlines in great detail the flight
of economic activity from developed countries to less developed countries (LDC). See D.S.
Mitchell, OECD Tax Competition Proposal: Higher Taxes and Less Privacy, TAX NOTES
801, 808-810 (Nov. 6, 2000).
'o A recent study has shown a large decrease in effective tax rates in the manufacturing
sector of approximately 27% from 1980 to 1992. See Rosann Altshuler, Harry Grobert, & T.
Scott Newton, Has United States Investment Abroad Become More Sensitive to Tax Rates?
available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w6383 (last visited Aug. 19, 2001).
3' See HUFBAUER, supra note 6, at 33.
32 Id. at 21.
33 Id.
3' Taxes Revisited, OECD, at 3 (2000).
3' The Disappearing Taxpayer, THE ECONOMIST 22, May 31, 1997.
16 Taxes Revisited, supra note 34.
" Taxing Wages in OECD Countries 1998/1999, OECD, Paris, 2000, T.1, available at
http://www.oecd.org/dat/stats/wages.htm (last visited Aug. 19, 2001).
3' The EU countries that are referred to are Belgium, Germany, Italy, and France.
3 Taxing Wages in OECD Countries 1998/1999, OECD, Paris, 2000, T.3, available at
http://www.oecd.org/dat/stats/wages.htm (last visited Aug. 19, 2001).
40 Professor Angelo Cardoni of Bocconia University is on the EU Commission.
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capital.",4' A 1997 economic work revealed that about four out of ten and
one-half percentage points in unemployment was attributable to the large
incidence of tax on labor.42
The impact of these forces has not been as acutely felt in the United
States because the United States is different from its European counterparts.
Generally, the United States is a low tax country, as it taxes a much lower
percentage of the GDP than its European competitors.4 This is reflected as
well in much lower taxes on labor income.4 Additionally, wages in the
United States are much lower than in its European counterparts. For exam-
ple, hourly compensation in the United States manufacturing sector in 1996
was $18.00 an hour, whereas the average hourly compensation in the Euro-
pean Union manufacturing sector in 1996 was $22.00.45 American workers
also tend to work more hours than their European counterparts.4 6  The
American worker is the only worker in the developed world who ranks
among the top twenty nations whose workers work the most hours per
year.4 Overall, American workers are the most productive in the world,
based on value produced per unit cost.48 To get a feel for what this means,
per dollar spent, American workers are thirty-five times more productive
than workers in Niger.
49
Although American workers have not experienced the unemployment
of their European counterparts,5° the significance of manufacturing jobs to
the United States economy has steadily declined; this is even more startling
in light of the fact that manufacturing in the United States is more profitable
4' Ruud A. Sommerhalder, Harmful Tax Competition or Harmful Tax Harmonization, 8
EC TAx REV. No. 4 at 244, 246 (1999).
42 G. Tabellini and F. Daveri, Unemployment Growth and Taxation in Industrial Coun-
tries, CENTER FOR ECONOMIC RESEARCH, RESEARCH DISCUSSION PAPER No. 1681, August
1997.
41 Recent figures on tax as a percentage of the GDP for several countries showed the fol-
lowing percentages: Denmark at 51.9%; Germany at 38.2%; the United Kingdom at 35.1%;
Japan at 28.8%; and the United States at 27.6%. See QUINLAN & STEVENS, supra note 21, at
144-45.
"See Taxing Wages in OECD Countries 1998/1999, OECD, Paris, 2000, T.3, available
at http://www.oecd.org/dat/stats/wages.htm (last visited Aug. 19, 2001).
41 BURTLESS, LAWRENCE, LITAN, & SHAPIRO, supra note 2, at 70.
46 QUINLAN & STEVENS, supra note 21, at 140.
41Id. at 156-57.
48 BURTLESS, LAWRENCE, LITAN, & SHAPIRO, supra note 2, at 67; R.E. Hall & C. 1. Jones,
Why Do Some Countries Produce So Much More Per Worker Than Others? 114 Q.J. ECON.
83, 83 (1999).
9 Hall & Jones, supra note 48, at 83.
The unemployment figures for 1997-98 indicated that the United States had less than
5% unemployment and the EU had 11% to 12% unemployment. QUINLAN & STEVENS, su-
pra note 21, at 152. However, these figures should be compared with worldwide unem-
ployment which was 30% or one billion workers in 1995 to 1996. Id.
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today than ever.51 In the 1950s, manufacturing accounted for one out of
three payroll obs; in 1994, manufacturing accounted for one out of seven
payroll jobs.5 Many blame decreases in American workers' real family in-
come on the loss of jobs resulting from the flight of United States business
from the States. While this is partially true, there are other factors such as
the competition from immigrants. 3 Perhaps one of the most emotional is-
sues facing the American political order is that of the runaway plant, where
goods previously manufactured in the United States are manufactured
abroad and are imported into the United States. Today 20% of the goods
imported into the United States are imported by United States multination-
als. 54 Many blame cheap labor, loose labor and environmental standards in
less developed countries as the culprit.55 Without doubt, there is significant
hardship to the workers and the local economy when a home country busi-
ness removes its manufacturing presence from the home country. Without
question, one of the causes of the runaway plant is that manufacturing is
much more sensitive today to tax rates.56
Despite the fact that the world economy is growing, not all are win-
ners. Only in the United States has unemployment decreased substantially.
Even American workers, however, have not seen much of an increase in
real wages over past decades. Data on the United States economy, at pre-
sent the largest and most dynamic economy in the world, indicate that the
principle beneficiaries of globalization are stockholders, executives, and
workers in successful exporting firms. 57 The standard of living has not in-
creased for all, even though statistics for the United States indicate that dur-
ing the period from 1969 to 1979, real family income increased on an
average for families in all income categories. However, from 1979
through 1995, real family income decreased for those in the two lowest
quintiles, increasing significantly only for those in the top 20%. Major
gains accrued only to those in the top 5%.59 Although recent indications
show some growth in real wages for all Americans, the growing gap be-
tween the rich and the majority of the population has not been eliminated.
60
" Manufacturing's decline as a share of the GDP is also attributable to the change in
spending patterns from goods to services like education, health, and travel. See BURTLESS,
LAWRENCE, LITAN, & SHAPIRO, supra note 2, at 52-53.
52Id. at 51-52.
' See id. at 88.
4 QUINLAN & STEVENS, supra note 21, at 68.
See John Douglas Wilson, Theories of Tax Competition, 52 NAT'L TAX J. 269, 270
(1999).
56 Altshuler, Grobert & Newton, supra note 30.
7 BURTLESS, LAWRENCE, LITAN, & SHAPIRO, supra note 2, at 10.
Id. at 26.
59 Id.
60 Economic Report of the President, 1997 at 166, 187, available at
http://www.umsl.edu/services/govdocs/erp/1997/titletoc.htm (last visited Aug. 19, 2001).
Optimal International Taxation and Tax Competition
22:161 (2002)
Therefore, most of the population is not sharing in the increased prosperity
that the new economic order is bringing.
Thus, there is strong evidence supporting the conclusion that many
countries' tax bases are being shifted from capital and business income to
labor and consumption. Speaking in broad generalities, European countries
have tried to maintain or increase government services by raising tax on
less mobile sources of revenue while trying to maintain existing levels of
corporate and capital taxation. The United States, even though it also dem-
onstrates some shift from capital to consumption and labor tax, has mainly
met tax competition by lowering taxes and by keeping wages low. Thus, it
can be generally concluded that the decline in real income for many is, in
part, attributable to a greater focus on labor and other less mobile activities
for revenue.
C. The Response of the European Union and the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development
Some say that tax competition is simply natural competition that leads
to increased benefits for all. The European Union ("EU") and the Organi-
zation for Economic Cooperation and Development ("OECD") disagreed.
Both the EU61 and the OECD 62 have adopted initiatives to counteract what
these organizations perceive as harmful tax competition. The object of both
is to eliminate certain tax provisions and regimes in countries that jeopard-
ize the tax systems of members. While the EU is only concerned with the
activities of its member states, the OECD has targeted all countries, both
members and non-members. The EU is concerned with investment and
business taxation in general; the OECD limits its immediate attention to fi-
nancial services and other highly mobile business income. The OECD's
overall concern is clearly relevant to all types of activities, including in-
vestment income.
Out of its 1997 Program 63 the EU proposed a legally non-binding Code
of Conduct on business taxation, which identifies harmful regimes and pro-
vides for an undertaking by the member states not to enact any additional
harmful tax regimes. In addition, a directive on investment income was
proposed that would have required member states to either impose a with-
holding tax on portfolio income or adapt a system to provide information on
61 Toward Tax Coordination in the European Union, A Package to Tackle Harmful Tax
Competition. Doc. COM (97) 495 final (Oct. 1, 1997).62 
HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION: AN EMERGING GLOBAL ISSUE 7 (OECD 1998); TOWARD
GLOBAL TAX COOPERATION: PROGRESS IN IDENTIFYING AND ELIMINATING HARMFUL TAX
PRACTICES, REPORT TO THE 2000 MINISTERIAL COUNCIL MEETING AND RECOMMENDATIONS
BY THE COMMITTEE ON FISCAL AFFAIRS, 5 (OECD 2000).
63 TOWARD GLOBAL TAX COOPERATION, supra note 62.
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portfolio investment to the payee's country of residence.64 Since the initial
proposal, the EU has deleted the withholding tax alternative from the pro-
posal .65
The OECD proposal had two objectives: (1) to identify harmful tax
practices of its member states and (2) to identify and deal with tax haven
regimes. 66 In the 2000 OECD report, sixty-one member country preferen-
tial regimes were identified.67 Member-states are obligated to remove these
practices within five years of the Guidelines' approval.68 The OECD also
identified thirty-five nations that met the tax haven criteria 6 but that had
not made an advanced commitment to eliminate harmful tax practices and
comply with the principles of the 1998 Report.70
The EU and the OECD have been criticized because their formulations
do not clearly explicate exactly the problem of tax competition." This is
valid because the test for harmful tax competition is in large part based on
the bad intent of the low tax jurisdiction. Low rates are not determinative,
but must be coupled with other factors that indicate enticement or conspira-
tonal conduct. These include regimes that provide tax preferences only to
non-residents, that lack effective exchange of information, 72 that lack trans-
parency,73 and that provide these benefits to enterprises that do not engage
in real economic activity or have a substantial economic presence in the ha-
74ven.
Thus, the proposals reflect mixed questions of avoidance and eva-
sion,75 which may be an inherent problem in dealing with the distinction be-
' Code of Conduct on Business Taxation, Doc. COM (97) 564 final (Adopted Dec. 1,
1997).
" Proposed Directive, Doc. COM (98) 295 final.
66 See HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION, supra note 62, at 10-11.
67 TOWARD GLOBAL TAX COOPERATION, supra note 62, 12-14.
6' HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION, supra note 62, at 70.
69 TOWARD GLOBAL TAX COOPERATION, supra note 62, at 17.
7 Id. at 16. The Advanced Commitment Jurisdictions were Bermuda, the Cayman Is-
lands, Cyprus, Malta, Mauritius and San Marino.
' Alex Easson, The Tax Competition Controversy, 18 TAX NOTES INT'L 371, 372 (Jan.
25, 1999).
72 HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION, supra note 62, at 23. "Tax havens typically have in place
laws or administrative practices under which businesses and individuals can benefit from
strict secrecy rules and other protections against scrutiny by tax authorities thereby prevent-
ing the effective exchange of information on taxpayers benefiting from the low tax jurisdic-
tion." Id.
" Id. "A lack of transparency in the operation of the legislative, legal or administrative
provisions is another factor in identifying tax havens." Id.
4 Id.
" Tax avoidance may be defined as the attempt to minimize one's tax obligations when
the taxpayer engages in activities or utilizes devices and reports their tax significance to the
government on the basis of support for the taxpayer's conclusion found in Code or case law,
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tween harmful and acceptable forms of tax competition. Tax havens often
connote evasion; some hold themselves out as places where the affairs of
taxpayers and particularly their bank accounts will be free from discovery
by the tax authorities of their home countries. The importance of tax eva-
sion to the developed world and, in particular, as a motivating force behind
the EU and the OECD initiatives, should not be underestimated. The
United Nations has estimated that evasion involves more money by a multi-
ple than the proceeds of all types of crimes.76 Even though one avowed
purpose of the EU and the OECD was to eliminate the preferences and to
motivate low tax regimes to increase their tax rates, one can conclude that
the institutions would be more than satisfied if only their second objective,
the sharing of tax information, was accomplished.7 Indeed, in the EU, the
Proposed Directive on investment income has been so transformed.78
III. THE TAX COMPETITION DEBATE
A. What Is Tax Competition?
The EU and the OECD's proposals on tax competition have raised
considerable emotion and debate.79 One might seriously ask whether one
can address this issue without the accompanying politics. Some indicate
that it is all personal opinion: "[t]here is no theoretical definition of tax
competition, let alone harmful tax competition. It seems to depend largely
on an individual's perception, and on the political persuasion of whoever
talks about harmful tax competition, whether that person is in favor of it, or
opposes it."
80
Certainly, after listening to the definitions of politicians, this observa-
tion is understandable. Mr. Waigel, the former German Minister of Fi-
nance, engaged in the following exchange when asked, "What is harmful
tax competition? ... Precisely, I don't know, but when I see it, I recognize
it..
,,s
Though it is true that the idea of "harmful" tax competition has a po-
litical element, this does not mean that the concept of tax competition is not
or administrative pronouncements. Tax Evasion is the taking of a position that the taxpayer
knows or should know to be unsupported by authority or legitimate interpretation.
76 Financial Havens, Banking Secrecy, and Money Laundering, at
http://www.imolin.org/finhaeng.htm (last visited Aug. 19, 2001).
77See Chuck Gnaedinger, EU Commission Satisfied with United States 'Harmful' Tax
Competition Position, 92 (No. 2) TAX NOTES 170 (July 9, 2001).
78 See Proposed Directive, supra note 65.
7 For views expressing vigorous opposition, see, e.g., BIAC Tax Committee Statement, A
Business View on Tax Competition, at http://www.biac.org (last visited Aug. 19, 2001);
Mitchell, supra note 29, at 801.
o Sommerhalder, supra note 41, at 244.
81 Id. at 247.
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subject to rational elucidation and the provision of a useful definition. Tax
competition is the nation's relinquishment, in whole or in part, of its right to
tax an economic activity, with the result that its effective tax is less than
that of other countries. Typically, tax competition is a purposeful activity
that nations engage in to attract or retain activity. The definition also re-
flects the notion that the shift of economic activity also shifts the appropri-
ate tax base from the country in which that activity originated to the new
country, and that the new country foregoes such taxation for perceived
benefit.
Such reduced taxation can effect the allocation of capital and the loca-
tion of business activities worldwide. A working assumption is that gov-
ernments choose policies of tax minimization in order to attract mobile
activities that will lead to the maximization of public welfare. Without
question, however, actions taken by one region to increase welfare may
have a dramatic negative impact on the welfare of other regions.82
This definition helps focus our understanding of the harmful tax com-
petition debate. Those who see some forms of tax competition as harmful
view nations that use tax preferences as "poaching" on the economic activ-
ity and the tax base that would have belonged to it. Those who welcome
tax competition see taxation as merely one cost factor among many that
should be subject to reduction through international competition like any
other cost. Framed in this way, tax competition is a question of politics, not
economics. One's initial approach depends on one's view of governmental
spending, and whether it taxes and spends wisely, maximizing welfare, or
whether it overtaxes and spends foolishly. In the latter case, tax, like other
facets of life, should be left to the free market and tax competition becomes
a successful tool in curbing governmental appetites for revenue.
83
Tax havens are often the focus of this issue. But one does not need to
look far to be aware of the profound effect that tax preferences have on
other countries. The proposition that capital flows toward low effective tax
rates14 is dramatically demonstrated in the United States. When tax rates on
business capital were dramatically lowered as a consequence of the Eco-
nomic Recovery Act of 1981,8s approximately $1 trillion of additional capi-
tal entered the United States.8 6 Another tax preference contained in United
82 Wilson, supra note 55, at 272.
8 See id. at 296.
84 Wilson, supra note 55, at 272.
s' ECONOMIC RECOVERY ACT OF 1981: LAW AND EXPLANATION (Commerce Clearing
House, Inc. 1981). The central feature of the Act was its provision for investment in capital
equipment, including accelerated depreciation schedules and investment tax credits. The
United States lists these as tax expenditures and thus, the expenditures qualified as tax pref-
erences. Cong. Joint Comm. On Taxation, Estimates ofFederal Tax Expenditures for Fiscal
Years 2000-2004, TAX NOTES 103, 114 (2000).
86 TANZI, supra note 1, at 137.
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States tax legislation is the personal deduction for home mortgage interest.
87
Where a nation grants a deduction for personal interest that others do not,
capital flows to that nation away from others, and borrowing is cheaper for
the residents of that country."8 Even though these United States provisions
do not run afoul of the OECD's indications of "harmful" tax competition,
89
these preferences have a large and potentially detrimental effect on the
world allocation of capital.
In general, tax competition presents trade-offs for many nations. Less
tax revenue generally results in either fewer public benefits or higher taxes
on less mobile factors. Governments tend to supply certain goods and ser-
vices that have proved to be unsuitable for private markets. 90 Since tax
competition more closely links taxation with public benefit; non-
competitive goods and services are the types of public goods and services
that disappear under tax competition models. 9' One study has even con-
cluded that where both home country and host country 92 compete for capital
with reduced rates and, consequently, reduced benefits, the home, the host
and even the business enterprises are worse off.
9 3
Politics go even deeper, however. Truly efficient tax competition re-
stricts governments in their endeavor to reallocate goods and services in a
nation state to achieve social reforms and the redistribution of wealth. In-
stead, efficient tax competition means that governments must tax in a way
that the amount paid reflects the value of goods and services received by the
taxpayer.
94
The proposed benefits of tax competition, however, depend upon
whether it is available to all. In other words, where taxpayers can vote with
their feet, they will choose the tax and the level of services that comports
with their personal choice or need. Those taxpayers who cannot vote with
their feet are at a disadvantage to those who can.
" 26. U.S.C. § 163(h). The United States also lists the personal deduction for home
mortgage interest as a tax expenditure. See Cong. Joint Comm. On Taxation, supra note 85,
at 112.
88 Wilson, supra note 55, at 272.
'9 See Easson, supra note 71, at 372; see also HARMFUL TAx COMPETITION, supra note 62,
at 23.
"' Wilson, supra note 55, at 295.
91 Id.
' For purposes of this article, the "home country" denotes the capital-exporting country,
which can be considered to be the country of the residence of the taxpayer who owns it.
"Host country" refers to the capital-importing country or the country in which the capital is
used.
9 Wilson, supra note 55, at 287.
Tax competition is often championed by those who do not favor redistributive policies.
See C. Neil Stephens, A Progressive Analysis of the Efficiencies of Capital Import Neutral-
ity, 30 LAW & POLICY IN INT'L BUs. 159, 184 (1988-1989).
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Those who promote tax competition typically belong to the interna-
tional business community. To gain directly from tax competition, one's
person or activities must be mobile. Thus, tax competition benefits owners
of capital and economic activities that are easily transportable, whether in
actuality or in form. This can include certain highly skilled workers whose
talent is much in demand. Most income of labor and the consumption of
those who labor are not particularly mobile due to culture, geography, im-
migration regulations or language. Thus, consumption taxes and employ-
ment taxes are not, at present, greatly threatened by tax competition. In
addition, some business activity, especially in the service sector, is concen-
trated in local markets and cannot take advantage of low tax jurisdictions.
Other business activity, due to size and lack of sophistication, is at a disad-
vantage in their efforts to compete against firms that can reduce costs
through tax arbitrage.
Indeed, because some tax bases are captive and others are mobile, gov-
ernments only need compete for the more mobile ones. Where competition
is fierce, governments may be willing to bargain away their tax base so that
it is disproportionately low in terms of the value of the benefit provided to
the economic activity through government goods and services, as when
governments grant total exemption or tax holidays for businesses in less de-
veloped countries or regions. Certainly, the prospect of additional jobs to a
region with high unemployment may be thought to be worth the tradeoff.
One difficulty of tax competition from the point of view of host countries is
that it shifts the burden of the public benefits from the more mobile activi-
ties to the less mobile activities - labor and consumption.
The concerns raised by the harmful tax competition debate always cen-
ter on the high tax jurisdictions' loss of tax base to the low. The previous
discussion, however, suggests that tax competition may be harmful to the
country offering the incentive. The benefits of tax competition to host
countries are temporary, and this is particularly important to less developed
countries that see tax incentives as the panacea for development. Firms at-
tracted by tax incentives are always looking for a better deal. Studies have
shown that tax incentives result in excessive firm turnover; once the tax
preference has ended, enterprises leave. 95
Thus, some conclude that tax incentives do not work for host coun-
tries. 96 Since the objective of tax competition is to attract an investment
that might not otherwise have produced a minimally acceptable return after
taxes, the benefit to the host country may be far outweighed by the costs to
the host for goods and services provided to the enterprise. If, alternatively,
9" Wilson, supra note 55, at 295.
96A.J. EASSON, TAXATION OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT: AN INTRODUCTION 164
(Kluwer Law Internat'l 1999).
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an enterprise would locate in the host regardless of whether or not the tax
incentive was provided, the host gives up its tax without consideration.
Thus, tax competition is inefficient from a global perspective, and, in
many cases, from the perspective of the host. Moreover, the impact of tax
preferences and low-tax regimes on home countries may be due to the eco-
nomic consequences of granting preferences, the benefit of which may be
mitigated over time due to their economic consequences. 97 This occurs be-
cause the flow of capital and importation of business and the inefficiencies
of granting tax preferences have certain significant economic consequences
to a host which can change the relative attractiveness of the host over the
years.98
Havens, however, do not operate under the same economic rules.
When enterprises engage in FDI, certain economic consequences to the
home and host occur. To illustrate, consider a home enterprise engaging in
manufacturing in a host.
FDI that flows from home to host results in a capital imbalance. Eco-
nomic principles require that imports and exports of capital, goods, and ser-
vices must be in equilibrium.99 The host net goods and services imports
must equal its net capital imports. 1°° Assuming that the host country has an
imbalance, that is, capital imports exceed capital exports, then economic
principles require that this discrepancy must be balanced by an increase in
the host's imports of goods and services. Though this effect may not hap-
pen overnight, it must occur for the nation's money will appreciate in value,
its exports will become more costly and decrease in amount, and the price
of foreign imports will be cheaper and increase in volume.' °'
Thus, we can see economically potent effects on the host from FDI,
which results in certain benefits like increased jobs, increased imports of
goods and services, and a higher standard of liying. These consequences
are independent of the way in which the host or home taxes.
However, there are some potential costs for the host. By opening its
borders to the benefits of FDI, it also exposes its residents to competition
from home enterprises. Costs such as labor increase. 10 2 Capital may be
withdrawn causing the reverse economic effect. The host economy is more
"7 HUFBAUER, supra note 6, at 152.
9
8 Id.
9 BURTLESS, LAWRENCE, LITAN, & SHAPIRO, supra note 2, at 33-34.
'o Id. This works in the opposite way when a nation experiences a trade deficit. Where
imports of goods and services exceed exports, additional capital must be imported to balance
the accounts.
"' Id. at 104. A similar result takes place within the home country. FDI increases capital
exports, which means either that capital imports will increase, that goods and service exports
will increase, or that goods and service imports will decrease.
'02 J.R. Hines & E.M. Rice, Fiscal Paradise: Foreign Tax Havens and American Busi-
ness, at http://www.nber.org/papers/w3477 (last visited August 19, 2001).
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integrated into the world order, and the host has less control of its destiny.
The consensus, however, is that the benefits of importing production factors
far outweigh the detriments of such importation.
1. Tax Havens
Tax havens and similar tax preference regimes largely remove the ef-
fects of the economic laws considered here by insulating themselves from
the effect of FDI and non-resident business. This is accomplished princi-
pally in two ways: by ring fencing and by maintaining the currency of busi-
ness enterprise in foreign specie.
First, ring fencing is the process of restricting the benefits of limited
taxation to so-called non-resident enterprises that are not permitted to do
business in local markets and to compete with local enterprises. 103 Thus,
the serious economic consequences of competition are eliminated. Similar
economic effects are found in other countries where special enterprise zones
are provided.
Second, nations can protect themselves from these economic effects by
requiring the business enterprise to conduct its affairs in non-local currency.
Usually the laws, in addition to the practical necessities of being located in
a small country, require that FDI, incomes, and expenditures (except for
small amounts for local purposes) be carried out in a currency other than
that of the havens. Thus, these non-resident businesses do not affect the
haven's essential economy by increasing imports or increasing currency
value. Though transactions are booked in the havens, much of the real eco-
nomic activity occurs elsewhere.
0 4
Overall, low tax rates typically found in small havens, and not in hosts
that provide significant markets for goods and services, favor capital inten-
sive over labor intensive activities.15 The relative mobility of investment
permits the separation of this income factor from the market host (or the
home) country and its placement in havens. Though financial services are
capital intensive, there is a substantial service component. Any service fac-
tor requiring large labor costs can be performed outside the offshore finan-
cial center.
Examples of this are the widespread use of havens for insurance and
banking. For insurance one typically finds captive insurers, 10 6 either the
self-insurers of TNCs or the subs of insurance providers. Captives typically
provide a reinsurance function, which is almost entirely a capital income
producing function.
03 See HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION, supra note 62, at 27.
041 Id at 22.
00 See Wilson, supra note 55, at 280.
'o For an account of the tax implications of captive insurance, see W. Barker, Federal In-
come Taxation and Captive Insurance, 6 VA. TAX REV. 267 (1986).
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Banking is also often found in small havens. Once again, a bank often
provides the function of a repository of capital. Few banks or insurance
companies have an actual physical presence. There is little true investment
by these financial intermediaries in haven countries.
Many tax havens are referred to as offshore financial centers (OFCs),
which are principally involved in the financial services sector and in FPI.
Many OFCs are countries that have less than 200,000 inhabitants.)0 7 For
example, the Cayman Islands is reported to be the fifth largest banking cen-
ter in the world, °8 having approximately 580 banks (with $500 billion in
holdings), 2,238 mutual funds, 499 insurance companies and 40,000 off-
shore entities in total.' 09 The Bahamas is also another major center, with
sixty insurance companies, 580 mutual funds, 418 banks and 100,000 off-
shore entities in total." 0 The Channel Islands and the Isle of Man have ap-
proximately $525 billion in foreign-owned assets."' Financial services
account for 80% of Isle of Jersey's income, the minimum nonresident ac-
count now being $100,000.11 2 The list goes on, with the result that the
country of Niue, a state with only 2,000 inhabitants, has 3,000 offshore
business entities.'' 3 In all, statisticians estimate that about $8 trillion
worldwide is invested in offshore accounts and entities.1 4 Thus, consider-
able amounts of capital are temporarily located in tax havens, and signifi-
cant financial service sector activity is at least nominally located in these
states.
2. Other Preferential Tax Regimes
Havens are not alone in relying on tax preferences to compete in the
world market. Many countries enact tax provisions that are meant to attract
highly mobile activities, and the economic effects can be similar to those
experienced by traditional tax havens.
The search for tax preferences represents a change in the underlying
objective behind FDI. In the past, one of the primary reasons for FDI was
107 Hines & Rice, supra note 102, at 3.
"0 Mitchell, supra note 29, at 810 n. 114. The four leading banking centers, in order by
size, are New York, London, Tokyo, and Hong Kong. Id.
09 United States Dep't of Treas., 27 Fin. Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCen Advis-
ing) (July 2000); Michael Allen, Tax Havens Cave in to Global Pressure, THE WALL ST. J.,
June 20, 2000.
"0 United States Dep't of Treas., supra note 109, at 13; William Allen, Statement by the
Bahamas to the OECD Forum on Harmful Tax Practices, OECD (August 30, 1999).
. Michael Peel & Francesco Guerrea, OECD Eyes Deal with Island Tax Havens,
FINANCIAL TIMES, August 4, 2000.
1' Tax Haven Island's Referendum Call Prompted by Government Support for Efforts to
Increase Financial Transparency, FINANCIAL TIMES, August 29, 2000.
..3 United States Dep't of Treas., supra note 109, at 22.
"' Mitchell, supra note 29, at 808 n.74.
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market access. Today, tax advantage is compatible with market access in
unified markets like the EU and NAFTA.
Also, market access does not mean that all activities need to be per-
formed in the host country that consumes the goods and services. Many ac-
tivities can be effectively provided outside the market without adversely
affecting access. Moreover, while trade in goods and services are generally
comparable, services can present some different wrinkles. Goods are actu-
ally sent from the country of manufacture to the country of purchase. Ser-
vices, being intangible, are often not sent from one place to another in the
same fashion. A document like an insurance policy can be sent to the coun-
try of the beneficiary, but the document is only evidence of the service.
Certainly, the insurance company may need direct contact with its customer
and may need a local establishment. In many cases, however, modem
communications can obviate the need for physical contact and a service
provider can be in another country.
The importance of tax factors to business has led to the growth of what
can be called intermediate companies in areas other than insurance and fi-
nancial services. Many countries provide special tax regimes for holding
companies, coordination centers (often referred to as operational or regional
headquarters), distribution centers, R&D centers and licensing centers.
These incentives are often provided only to nonresidents.
Intermediate hosts or havens provide these special tax regimes because
they attract enterprises that would not otherwise locate in the host or haven.
These companies provide either a conduit function or a service function.1 s
Conduit enterprises typically share the same economic characteristics as
small havens; they are ring-fenced, keep their transactions in non-local cur-
rencies, or engage in transactions where imports roughly equal exports.
This insulates the local economy from significant effects.
.Companies that provide service functions, like coordination centers
and R&D centers, engage in activities that are not directly in competition
with local business. However, depending on the exact nature of the activ-
ity, it can have a significant physical presence with a concomitant effect on
the local economy.
It appears that tax havens and nations utilizing tax preferences for in-
termediate companies have benefited from tax competition. Principally, the
presence of foreign business provides some tax revenue, increased em-
ployment income, and an increased labor tax base. 116 Foreign firms may
pay higher wages," 7 and in some cases there can be positive externalities on
account of the diffusion of new technologies and production techniques." 8
"5 Easson, supra note 71, at 80-81.
16 Hines & Rice, supra note 102, at 29.
17 Id. TNCs may not pay higher wages in LDCs where unemployment is high.
118 Id.
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There also may be a downside to foreign presence, including increased la-
bor costs for local firms, pollution and undue political influence exercised
by foreign firms on small countries.
119
It is the large havens, referred to as the "Big 7, " 2o that have benefited
the most by their status. Significant value has been added to their econo-
mies by TNCs, and, surprisingly at little cost to tax revenues.12 1 The only
conclusion is that the Big 7 offers TNCs the possibility of significant profit
due to factors other than low tax. The Big 7 appears to be the location of
most of the physical activity undertaken by TNCs in tax havens.
122
It is probable that the reason for this is that investment in many devel-
oped and developing economies results in the commitment of real re-
sources. Capital movements, however, do not necessarily trigger the
movement of real resources. 123 OFCs and certain intermediate structures
that specialize in conduit operations do not result in the movement of real
resources to a low tax regime, because the purpose of incentive is not to at-
tract capital to be used in the host. Though linking two activities together is
a real economic activity, it is not the activity of utilizing capital to produce
income. Capital movements to tax havens "may simply reflect accounting
transfers in which profits are allocated to countries with low tax rates.' 2
Thus, the evidence indicates that the United States and other nations TNCs
report significant income in tax havens even when little physical activity
takes place there. 21 In United States firms, profits are reported that are dis-
proportionate to the quality of factors utilized by firms in the tax havens.
126
To illustrate, developing countries' share of portfolio equity was less
than 2% in 1980 and was 30% in 1990;127 the increase was largely attribut-
able to the growth in the use of tax havens. Estimates of foreign investment
by G-7 countries in a number of Caribbean and South Pacific OFCs in-
creased five-fold to over $200 billion from 1985 to 1994.128
Focusing on OFCs, asset statistics reveal that countries with 0.3% of
the world's population and 0.3% of the world's GDP attract 24% of United
States FDI.' 9 Financial services dominate this investment, including, prin-
cipally, banking (60% of total assets in havens) and other financial activi-
119 Id.
110Id. at T. 2, 3. The "Big 7" consists of Hong Kong, Ireland, Liberia, Lebanon, Panama,
Singapore and Switzerland. Id. at T. 1 n.5.
"' Id. at 30.
1 Id. at3.
123 TANZ1, supra note 1, at 73.
'24 Id. at73 n.15.
12' Hines & Rice, supra note 102, at 24.
2I Id. at 30.
127 GRIFFITH-JONES, supra note 9, at 27.
28 Easson, supra note 71, at 162.
29 Hines & Rice, supra note 102, at T. 1, 9, 11.
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ties like insurance (23% of total assets in havens). 30 Financial services,
constituting 84.3% of tax haven assets and over 20% of total United States
FDI, only accounts for less than 0.5% of United States TNC employment.131
Thus, there is convincing evidence that many TNCs present in OFCs
are pocketbook companies without real assets located in the haven and
without any physical activity taking place in the haven. Oftentimes, these
centers are used merely to book capital overnight before it returns to the
country of origin.'32
Free capital mobility results in the flow of capital from high to low tax
jurisdictions. The intense competition for mobile activities is generally
causing countries to reduce their tax rates to zero on these activities. 133 Na-
tions' fear of tax disintegration, or a fevered race to the bottom with regard
to mobile tax bases such as capital and corporate profits, is indeed a real-
ity. 134 Whether one sees this as good or evil may ultimately depend upon
one's view as to whether capital income should be taxed at all. Assuming
that nations are not willing to abandon taxation of capital income, then this
issue cannot be addressed solely as a question of political choice until one
considers the fundamental premise of tax competition, that is, what is each
nation's appropriate base for the taxation of international economic activi-
ties. Only after examining appropriate international taxation can we truly
answer the question of what the problem of tax competition is and if it is
harmful.
B. The Present Approach to International Taxation
Where economies are closed, there need be little concern for a proper
jurisdictional basis for the imposition of income taxation. Where either the
economic activities that give rise to the taxable base or the persons or enti-
ties involved have either foreign components or allegiance, then nations
must grapple with the question of the appropriate basis for taxation.
Though a nation's laws differ, there is a worldwide consensus on the fun-
damental approach to transactions with international dimensions. Taxation
today is based on one of two jurisdictional precepts: source taxation and
residence taxation. 135
"'oId. at T. 9.
131 Id.
,32 See Mitchell, supra note 29, at 809.
... See Wilson, supra note 55, at 295.
"' ASSAF RAZIN & CM-WA YUEN, Optimal International Taxation and Growth Rate Con-
vergence: Tax Competition vs. Coordination, 6 INT'L TAX & PUB. FIN., 61, 69 (Kluwer,
1999).
' Most of the world uses the words residence or domiciliary taxation to identify this sec-
ond basis for taxation. Residence is meant to include policies like that of the United States
that taxes citizens on their worldwide income. See 26 U.S.C. § 61 (1994).
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The key to international tax principles is to focus on the appropriate
connecting factors: the elements that connect the tax base to the taxing ju-
risdiction in such a way as to suggest taxation is appropriate. Source juris-
diction is a direct method of attribution; it proposes that a country has the
right to tax income that has "arisen" in the country. It is in rem jurisdiction;
it attempts to place the transaction or economic activity giving rise to the
income in a particular country. Thus, the nation that has the power over the
activity which gives rise to the income has the right to tax it.
Residence, on the other hand, is an indirect method of attributing in-
come to a particular country. Residence taxation does not look directly at
the economic activity that produced the income, but instead looks to the
person or entity that is the taxpayer. Residence taxation is in personam ju-
risdiction; it is based on the relationship of the taxpayer to the taxing juris-
diction, and, where the relationship is sufficient, seeks to tax that person on
income irrespective of the country of source. Thus, the nation that has a
special relation to a person and, hence, has the power over that person, has
the right to tax that person on his or her worldwide income.
With two arguably independent bases for taxation, conflict among ju-
risdictions is bound to arise. In such cases, taxpayers may find themselves
subject to double or triple taxation on the same income by different jurisdic-
tions. Three possible areas of conflict may arise: (1) residence v. residence,
(2) source v. source, and (3) source v. residence. Such jurisdictional over-
laps can result from differing approaches to residence taxation, from differ-
ing approaches to source taxation, or from jurisdictions applying
independent bases for taxation (source versus resident conflicts). Consid-
erations of how these conflicts arise and what countries do about them is
necessary to complete the general outline of international principles today.
Though there is no principle of international law that re uires a nation
to relinquish jurisdiction to tax once it is properly asserted, nations have
largely tried to ameliorate the consequences of double taxation. Conflicts
resulting from different definitions of residence are difficult to resolve
without bilateral agreement because unilateral action would require a nation
to give up an approach that seemed obviously right to it. Many countries,
however, simply do not tax on the basis of residence alone, or restrict their
resident-taxation to limited kinds of income.
Source conflicts can be significant because most nations tax at least
some types of income on this basis and, once again, conflicts are difficult to
resolve without bilateral action. Whose rule should give way is a matter for
negotiation, not simple concession.
The third and clearly the most important conflict is that between source
and residence. This conflict is the most devastating because it is inherent in
36 RAMON J. JEFFERY, THE IMPACT OF STATE SOVEREIGNTY ON GLOBAL TRADE AND
INTERNATIONAL TAXATION 43-44 (Kluwer 1999).
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the concept of two independent jurisdictional bases for taxation. Here, as in
some of the approaches to source and resident rules, international consensus
has been established by work done by international organizations. Today,
the doctrine is that "source jurisdiction is considered primary. '  That
means that resident-nations unilaterally should defer to source nations. To-
day, this approach has become a fundamental maxim of international tax
law.
There is, however, nothing apriori to the approach that residence must
defer to source. Indeed, this approach was initially the result of the triumph
of politics over theory. Today, it is justified by custom and the accepted
application of theories of economic efficiency. By examining how the
world came to its present posture we shall begin to see the important issues
that the present approach has failed to address and why this approach does
not truly satisfy the tests of economic efficiency.
Until the 20"' century, the world gave little attention to the subject of
international taxation partly because comprehensive income taxation was
still a relatively new form of taxation. 13 8 Only two nations, the United
Kingdom and the United States, had adopted comprehensive taxation of in-
come, both foreign and domestic, in the nineteenth century.13 9 Addition-
ally, except for the internationally and commercially- oriented powers of the
Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States, most countries'
economies were relatively closed, 40 and most countries had currency con-
trol legislation in place. Thus, most taxation was strictly territorial in na-
ture.'
14
The aftermath of World War I found nations in great need of revenue.
The norm became an over-expansion of source jurisdiction, with nations as-
suming that the easy fix to their revenue needs was to be found in the taxa-
tion of foreigners. 42 Thus, certain trading nations unilaterally determined
to sacrifice their domiciliary taxation in order to facilitate free trade. 143 In
this context, the League of Nations began to deal with the problem of inter-
national double taxation in 1921.44 This led to the adoption of model con-
'AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF UNITED STATES INCOME
TAXATION, FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT 8 (Tentative Draft No. 10, April 1, 1983). This
principle is often reversed when countries enter into tax treaties. See infra notes 263-267.
"' The first truly comprehensive income tax system was that of the United Kingdom, be-
gan in 1799. See Barker, A Comparative Approach to Income Tax Law in the United King-
dom and the United States, 46 CATH. L. REV. 7, 12 (1996).
139 Id.
... TANZI, supra note 1, at 15.
141 JEFFREY, supra note 136, at 43.
141 MICHAEL B. CARROLL, LEAGUE OF NATIONS: PREVENTION OF INTERNATIONAL DOUBLE
TAXATION AND FISCAL EVASION: TWO DECADES OF PROGRESS UNDER THE LEAGUE OF
NATIONS 7-8 (June 22, 1939).
" Id. at 8.
... Id. at 11.
Optimal International Taxation and Tax Competition
22:161 (2002)
ventions in 1928) 4  The importance of this work to international taxation
cannot be overemphasized. "[T]he fundamental structure for international
taxation of income announced nearly seven decades ago in the 1928 League
of Nation's Model Treaty forms the common basis for more than twelve
hundred bilateral tax treaties now in force throughout the world.1
146
The success of the League's work was due to two quite different, but
equally important, reports: the first being a theoretical study of double taxa-
tion entrusted to four economists 47 and the second a study conducted by a
group of technical experts charged with the study of double taxation and
evasion from the perspective of administration and practicality.'4
The role of the economists was to try to systematically tackle the ques-
tion of appropriate international taxation.149 The report of the technical ex-
perts, on the other hand, was to suggest a workable outcome for the
times."o The economic advisors' goal was to achieve equity among na-
tions. They ultimately recommended that the country of source should ex-
empt all non-resident income, thus abolishing source taxation and
establishing resident taxation as the only appropriate jurisdiction to tax.
Since their economic theory ceded very little income tax jurisdiction to
source countries, simply allocating all taxation to resident countries made
good practical sense.
The final proposals of the League of Nations were based largely on the
recommendations of the committee of technical experts recommending
source over residence. 52 Though the committee recognized the economic
justification of the economic advisors,'53 its proposal was to refrain from
adopting "any one single solution,"' 4 but to adopt an approach that would
establish source as supreme but would provide the basis for a modification
of this hierarchy in favor of residence through treaties between nations. In
its final form, the League adopted three model conventions that set forth
different ways double taxation could be eliminated depending on the fiscal
141 Id. at 20.
146 Michael J. Graetz & Michael M. O'Hear, The "Original Intent" of United States In-
ternational Taxation, 46 DUKE L.J. 1021, 1023 (1997) (citing Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The
Structure of International Taxation: A Proposal for Simplification, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1301,
1303 (1996)).
"' See generally, Bruins, Einaudi, Seligman & Stamp, LEAGUE OF NATIONS, REPORT ON
DOUBLE TAXATION (Apr. 3, 1923).
"' See generally, LEAGUE OF NATIONS, REPORT OF THE TECHNICAL EXPERTS, DOUBLE
TAXATION AND TAX EVASION (Feb. 7, 1925).
'4' CARROLL, supra note 142, at 11.
1d.
'
5 Id. at 41-42.
152 League of Nations, Report of the Technical Experts, supra note 148, at 15. See also
Graetz & O'Hear, supra note 146, at 1027.
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peculiarities and objectives of the nations party to the convention, that is,
choices that would depend on their level of trade and whether they were
debtor or creditor nations.
55
In coming to this resolution, the League had some aid from a late arri-
val, the United States.'56 Although in its original 1913 tax act, the United
States had adopted the deduction from income method for foreign taxes to
eliminate double taxation,' 57 in 1918, the United States adopted, to the sur-
prise of even its proponents, the foreign tax credit with little opposition or
even notice.1 58 The purpose of this change was to provide equity to indi-
vidual taxpayers by eliminating double taxation.59
Contrary to the common sense view that capital-exporting nations
might grow tired of subsidizing the tax revenues of foreign governments,
this American policy had a basis in reality because of the economic and po-
litical conditions of the time. After World War I, the export of American
goods depended considerably on the export of capital. 60 Additionally, as a
practical matter, most nations were limited to source taxation. Thus, the tax
system reflected the United States government's objectives to encourage the
export of capital and to favor other nations' tax systems for reasons that
may not have reflected appropriate tax principles.
Thus, the United States, a country committed to comprehensive income
taxation, combined with the debtor nations to establish the primacy of
source. The claims of the United Kingdom to a fair recognition of resident-
principles in keeping with the report of the economic advisors were ig-
nored. Thus, the international tax rules that developed that elevated
source over residence were the product of several factors: the need to act
equitably towards individual taxpayers, the need to recognize that income
tax systems in their infancy rely on source taxation and the United States'
pragmatic view that exporting capital was in the national interest. The re-
sult was a clear repudiation of the concept of equity among governments,
which had been the central focus of the economic experts.
IV. THE ERROR OF INTERNATIONAL TAX PRINCIPLES
Our present system of international tax is the heritage of a time when
there were few nations engaging in global taxation, few exporting capital,
significant worldwide legislation restricting the flow of capital leaving most
'"5 CARROLL, supra note 142, at 21, 22.
56 The United States experts joined the deliberations in 1927. CARROLL, supra note 142,
at 11.
'"See Act of Oct. 3, 1913, ch. 16, 38 Stat. 114, § 2, 38 Stat. at 167.
'5 See Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, §§ 222(a)(1), 238(a), 240(c), 40 Stat. 1057, 1073,
1080-82 (1919).
' Graetz & O'Hear, supra note 146, at 1049-50 n.1 18.
160 Id.
16' Graetz & O'Hear, supra note 146, at 1050.
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nations, fairly closed economies and unsophisticated income tax systems.
Obviously, the world today does not reflect these conditions, with free and
ever-increasing trade, a tendency toward free capital and other factor
movement and ever-growing worldwide economic integration. Such
changes should at least make one consider whether the political compro-
mise of the past is still the best solution today.
Moreover, the political compromise was one-sided and ignored certain
critical elements of appropriate international tax principles. It reflected one
overriding objective to the exclusion of all others, that of individual equity.
The resolution ignored the most current economic analysis of the day pro-
vided by the economic experts on the equitable division of the tax base,
thus ignoring equity among nations. The solution did not anticipate that
many nations would move away from source-based taxation of income due
to the compulsion of economic forces. Finally, the solution ignored the
economic efficiencies or lack thereof of different approaches to interna-
tional taxation, and how international tax principles impact national and
worldwide prosperity. The force of these factors aim international taxation
in a different direction. Proper appreciation of these factors' importance to
the rational allocation of tax jurisdiction leads to an optimal approach to in-
ternational taxation relying on a set of principles and actual tendencies of
nations in world taxation that lead to fair and efficient taxation.
A. Inter-nation Equity
When considering international tax avoidance or evasion, one thought
is that it is immaterial which country gets the tax as long as some country
imposes tax on the transactions or persons at issue. Indeed, part of the
OECD solution to the tax competition problem is for tax havens to impose
tax, thus making it less likely that the tax base will flow to these havens.
162
Should legal principles only address equity to an individual taxpayer or
should tax law be concerned with whether nations who tax have a justifica-
tion for doing so, or that those having such a justification get their rightful
share?
Suppose two investors have equal amounts of money to invest. One
chooses a taxable investment, the other, a tax-exempt. Is this equitable be-
tween these taxpayers because it is the outcome of free choice? 16 The gov-
ernment gets taxes only from one taxpayer, whereas both taxpayers get
benefits from the government. When considering tax alone, it is inequitable
because one taxpayer pays for the benefits conferred on the other. This
scheme can only be thought equitable if one takes governmental subsidies
162 See HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION, supra note 62.
163 Some conclude that this is equitable. See HUGH S. AULT & DAVID F. BRADFORD,
TAXING INTERNATIONAL INCOME: AN ANALYSIS OF THE UNITED STATES SYSTEM AND ITS
ECONOMIC PREMISES, TAXATION IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 11, 29 (Assaf Razin and Joel S.
Pemrod, eds., Univ. of Chicago Press 1990).
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 22:161 (2002)
into account, and assumes that the forgone taxes represent a government
expenditure of equal value to another and, hence, the non-taxpayer is in re-
ality paying taxes. Even so, equity exists between the taxpayers only if the
foregone taxes are fully capitalized in the rate of return of the tax-exempt
investment, and other income being equal, the return to each taxpayer is the
same after tax.
Consider, on the other hand, a taxpayer "A," resident of country "X,"
who invests in country "Y." From the point of view of the individual inves-
tor, it is typically a matter of indifference to which country she pays tax. If
both countries X and Y effectively impose the same rate of tax, then it is
immaterial to which country the tax is paid, and the investor should place
her investment where she gets the highest rate of return.
This state of affairs is not one that country X, or by representation, the
taxpayers of country X should view with indifference. The investment in
country X as opposed to Y would produce tax revenues. Assuming that
Taxpayer A, as a resident of country X, has the same claim on society
whether her money is invested at home or abroad, the shortfall in revenues
due to country X's failure to tax must be made up with either additional as-
sessments on the taxpayers of country X or by a reduction in benefits to all.
Thus, country X and its taxpayers are quite interested to which country the
tax base belongs. 164 Nor can the absence of tax be considered a government
expenditure that is accomplishing country X's governmental objective; it is
in fact accomplishing another government's objective, that of country Y.
B. Fundamental Concepts of Equity and Their Application
to International Taxation
In the early part of the 2 0th century, comprehensive income taxation
was in its infancy. Except for the United Kingdom and the recent return to
comprehensive income taxation in the United States, most nations of the
world taxed income on a sporadic, schedular basis. 165
International taxation for schedular countries, therefore, focused on in-
come from items and the justification for taxation depended upon whether
the economic events could be said to be situated in the jurisdiction. Global
" Indeed, assuming tax rates of 50% in two countries, and country Y received all of the
tax, then the foreign investment must be twice as profitable as the home's investment to be
as profitable from the home country's perspective. See Peggy Richman, Taxation of Foreign
Investment Income: An Economic Analysis, JOHN HOPKINS PRESS 12-20 (1963). The loss to
the home country would be greater if the capital and profits were not repatriated.
161 "Synthetic or global taxation begins with a holistic approach to income; income is
treated the same no matter what its kind or source. Moreover, synthetic taxation often is
linked to residence as opposed to a source principle of international taxation. Schedular sys-
tems, on the other hand, separate income into its constituent parts; they take as their starting
point solely the sources of income and restrict themselves to taxing incomes which originate
from internal, domestic sources." Barker, supra note 138, at 16 (footnote omitted).
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taxation looks at income as a whole and considers of first importance the
circumstances of the individual. Thus, unlike global systems, which look to
the totality of a taxpayer's circumstances to assess tax, schedular systems
take taxpayer's affairs piecemeal and tend not to take individual circum-
stances into account. Thus, the rational of schedular taxation becomes on
one level simply power over the acts within a nation's borders, and, on an
equitable level, the connection between the activities and the benefits con-
ferred by government. International source taxation is typically identified
by flat rates applicable to all, few deductions and a total absence of consid-
eration for personal circumstances.
166
Comprehensive income taxation, on the other hand, is identified by
progressive tax principles, full deductions and allowances that comprehen-
sively take into consideration the circumstances of the taxpayer. Due to its
quite different nature, modern theory supporting comprehensive income
taxation has shifted its justification from benefit received to ability to pay.
Ability to pay theory depends upon as comprehensive an assessment of the
taxpayer's circumstances as is possible. Taxation follows taxpayers' con-
trol over resources and does not rely directly on the actual benefit the tax-
payer receives either from the government or from living in the society.
The economic experts based their approach to appropriate tax base al-
location on the more comprehensive theory of ability to pay. 167 Certainly, it
made sense to reject a theory that did not address the concerns of compre-
hensive taxation 168 and provided a simplistic or partial notion of taxpayer
equity.
169
This led the economic experts to the development of the theory of eco-
nomic allegiance to properly allocate the tax base.170 They recognized a po-
tential objection to using a faculty theory of taxation when dealing with the
source-based taxation of items. 71 They concluded that a faculty theory was
the appropriate theory of income tax because persons, not things, pay
taxes."'
Faculty theory assumes a special relationship between the taxpayer and
the taxing jurisdiction. It is that relationship that justifies taxation that is
not directly related to the benefits one receives, that makes it defensible that
a taxpayer may pay much more than the value of what one receives and that
justifies worldwide taxation over activities of a taxpayer, who may not have
66 See HIGH J. AULT, COMPARATIVE INCOME TAXATION: A STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS 431,
445 (Kluwer 1997); see also 26 U.S.C. § 871.
167 League ofNations, Report on Double Taxation, supra note 147, at 18.
168 Id.
169 Id. It was remarked that the theory of ability to pay (or the faculty of the taxpayer)
"includes what there is of value in the benefit theory." Id.
170 Id. at 20-22.
171 Id. at 18.
"2 Id. at 18-19.
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directly benefited from governmental services. In short, ability to pay re-
flects residence taxation, the special relationship between the taxpayer and
the state that justifies such taxation. It does not justify source-based taxa-
tion where there is no special relationship between state and a non-resident
and where there is no obligation on the part of the state to pay benefits like
education, health and Social Security irrespective of the taxpayer's contri-
bution. There should be no obligation on the part of a non-resident to pay
taxes without the provisions of demonstrable government services. Thus,
implicit in ability to pay as a justification of tax jurisdiction is its almost to-
tal incompatibility with source taxation.
Thus, the primary theory of source-based international taxation, other
than raw power, can only be the exchange or cost-benefit principle. A gov-
ernment supplies services, and a government generally has the right to tax
those who directly benefit or have activities that "fall in a class that may
fairly be presumed to benefit." '173 On the other hand, the primary theory of
residence-based taxation today is ability to pay. Ability to pay affects both
what is included in the tax base and the amount of tax due from the particu-
lar individual based on the size of her tax base and her personal circum-
stances.
The equity of source-based taxation is the equity of the exchange the-
ory. Fairness to a taxpayer is achieved by taxing her according to her bene-
fit. Intergovernmental equity is irrelevant because the source country
charges for what it provides. Fair exchange, however, is not remotely pos-
sible unless the source state restricts itself to user charges. The equity of
residence-based taxation, however, is that a taxpayer contributes according
to her ability to pay, which is primarily societal equity. It is also individual
equity when viewed from the perspective of the taxpayer as a social being,
treated as a whole with all the benefits and burdens of social life. Consid-
eration of these various facets of equity can help complete the puzzle of op-
timal international taxation.
C. International Taxation and Economic Efficiency
Since the inception of the modern international tax regime, economists
have often considered the question of what factors govern an economically
efficient international tax regime. Their work has given us a different per-
spective for analyzing economic efficiency and some important considera-
tions for resolving conflicts arising from the doctrine's different
approaches.
In general, an efficient tax is a neutral tax, that is, the incidence of the
tax should not change the relative prices of goods and services in the private
"3 DAVID R. TILLINGHAST, TAX ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS 3 (Matthew
Bender 1984).
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sector.174 Taxes are considered to be efficient if resources are used in such
a way that maximizes their output. 75 A tax can be inefficient when its inci-
dence distorts economic decision making from a track, which would have
been followed in the absence of the tax. That is because economic activity
should be free to find its most efficient levels. An inefficient tax creates an
excess burden on society, typically expressed in terms of a cost that is dis-
proportionate with the tax revenue raised. 176
The intensity of the distortion caused by taxation is largely dependent
on two factors: the rate of tax and the elasticity of the tax base. The lower
the rate and the less elastic the tax base, the lower the effect taxation will
have on economic decision-making. 77 A tax base is elastic if it is relatively
mobile. Open economies with free factor movements create the strong pos-
sibility of high tax base elasticity.
17 8
There are three economic doctrines that advance different approaches
to the ideal of economic efficiency in international taxation that deal with
the distortions created by potentially mobile tax bases. These are Capital
Export Neutrality ("CEN"), Capital Import Neutrality ("CIN") and National
Neutrality ("NN").
179
In brief, CEN espouses the view that capital should be taxed at the
same rate whether utilized in the home country or in the host country. CEN
examines efficiency from the perspective of the home country; neutrality is
achieved where the decision of whether to invest at home or abroad is unaf-
fected by taxation because the tax incidence will be the same. CEN's effect
is to provide for the efficient allocation of capital between the home and
host.
The traditional view is that CEN theory supports resident-based taxa-
tion. While it is true that CEN justifies resident-based jurisdiction, it does
not require that the home country actually receive any tax, and it is satisfied
if the host country taxes the income at the same rate as would have been the
case if the home country had been the sole taxing nation.
CIN theory, on the other hand, holds that capital should be taxed at the
same rate as that imposed on domestic capital in the capital-importing na-
tion. CIN is said to promote the efficient allocation of capital worldwide.
CEN deals with the efficient allocation of the home nation's supply of capi-
tal, whereas CIN provides for the efficient provision of the capital-
174 Norman Ture, Taxing Foreign Source Income, in United States Taxation of American
Business Abroad, AEI HOOVER POLICY STUDIES 38 (1975).
171 RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE AND PEGGY B. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE IN THEORY AND
PRACTICE 193 (McGraw-Hill 1973).
176 Id.
177 See TANZI, supra note 1, at 4.
7 1Id. at 12-13.
17' For one of the earliest accounts of these approaches, see R.A. Musgrave, Criteria for
Foreign Tax Credit, in Taxation and Operations Abroad, TAX INSTITUTE SYMPOSIUM (1959).
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 22:161 (2002)
importing nation's demand for capital.' 80 The prevailing thought is that
CIN mandates territorial, source-based taxation only, implemented by the
capital-exporting nation exempting foreign-sourced income."' 1 Whereas it
is true that there is no room for resident-based tax where the host imposes
the same level of tax on all capital income whether domestic or foreign,
were the host to exempt non-resident capital income and still tax its own
residents' capital income, the home country would be required to impose
the host country's tax rate on the home country's residents in order to sat-
isfy the predicate for CIN.
The third doctrine, NN, provides that both the home and the host can
tax capital, thus creating the possibility of international double taxation.
Under this approach, the home country defers in part to the host country by
providing a deduction against income for the foreign taxes paid. No matter
how small the host country's tax, this method will always result in a tax lar-
ger than would have been the case if the home or host alone had taxed.
Clearly, NN promotes resident-based taxation since it penalizes the export-
ing owner of capital, and hence, the capital-importing nation.
As a general proposition, with tax harmonization, neutrality would be
achieved with either CIN or CEN. Assuming the free flow of capital, if all
countries adopted the source principle of taxation and the tax rates were the
same, international savings would be allocated efficiently because the rates
of return on capital and after tax returns would have to be the same in order
to attract capital.'82 Similarly, if all countries adopted only residence taxa-
tion with the same rates, the tax would not disturb the return on capital
crossing national lines.183
Since harmonization is not presently obtainable and nations might still
be interested in the proper allocation of the tax base, one still searches for
the optimal theory. How can one choose between maximizing world sav-
ings that CIN promotes and the efficient allocation of world investment
promoted by CEN. Surprisingly, the overwhelming answer economists pro-
vide is that CEN is the optimal theory. 184
' Thomas Horst, A Note on the Optimal Taxation of International Investment Income, 94
Q. J. ECON. 793, 796 (1980).
S' BRIAN J. ARNOLD AND MICHAEL J. MCINTYRE, INTERNATIONAL TAX PRIMER 7 (Kluwer
1995).
.8 Assaf Razin and Efrain Sadka, International Tax Competition and Gains from Tax
Harmonization, 37 ECON. LETTERs 61, 69-70 (1991).
1
83 Id.
"' See, e.g., Richman, supra note 164, at 8; RAzIN & YUEN, supra note 134, at 69. For
others, see also Klaus Vogel, Worldwide vs. Source Taxation of Income - A Review and Re-
evaluation of Arguments (Part II), INTERTAX 311-312 (1988). Cf. Ture, supra note 174, at
38. Ture supports CIN because he believes that each nation should respect the peculiarities
of other states tax laws, and allow each nation to be the sole arbiter of the effect of tax policy
within its borders. Id. at 37. As will be shown, this permits the host to be the arbiter of the
home's tax policies as well.
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Strictly speaking, economic principles of efficiency are not concerned
directly with fairness to taxpayers, but with the efficient allocation of capi-
tal and the effect tax has on worldwide savings. Each theory has goals. If
the theory does not accomplish its goals, it would not be a correct economic
choice.
Thomas Horst provided an economic proof that international economic
efficiency depends on the relationship between the supply and demand for
capital. 8 Though his proof was demonstrated in terms of absolute op-
tions,' 86 the real world lies at neither extreme, but someplace in between,
and the relations between supply and. demand are relative. In general,
where the elasticity of the supply of savings, its potential for expansion or
contraction, is greater than the elasticity of the demand for savings, CIN
principles would promote increased savings in the home country and would
better supply the host country's demand for capital. An appropriate as-
sumption was that the supply for capital, not just the demand, for capital
varies with the rate of return, and that lower tax rates in host countries
would create a higher return.
1 87
Where the opposite occurs, when demand is more elastic than supply,
because demand increases in a greater proportion to supply for capital
where the rate of return is greater, then CEN is optimal. In essence, where
demand is greater than supply, CEN ensures that a home nation's capital
will be allocated between foreign and domestic uses solely on the basis of
the rate of return before taxes. CEN ensures that a nation's capital will not
be dissipated and be largely engaged in foreign use. In other words, CIN
supposes that lower rates will increase savings creating excess capital, and
that host nations will benefit from this extra capital. If CIN does not oper-
ate as expected, CIN would be an unmitigated disaster for the home coun-
try.
NN, on the other hand, supposes that supply and demand for capital are
both fixed. Basically, any augmented supply of capital would simply sub-
stitute for pre-existing capital. Thus there would be no reasons to encour-
age additional savings.
88
Horst assumed that the savings rate was responsive to tax levels, and
cited studies on the subject. The issue, however, is not whether there is re-
sponsiveness, but whether the supply of capital would increase at a greater
rate than the demand for capital, or whether savings is more responsive to
higher rates of return than demand is to lower costs of capital. The evi-
dence is quite to the contrary. The prevailing wisdom is that there is a high
elasticity of demand over savings and that savings are not particularly elas-
' See Horst, supra note 180, at 793.
I86 d. at 794.
SId. at 793.
's Id. at 796.
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tic." 9 In other words, the evidence does not indicate that taxation has any
effect on savings or that low tax rates promote savings. 90
Thus, the precondition for the effectiveness of CIN is missing. The
world's expanding demand for capital in the face of available supplies is
leading many nations to abandon taxation of the capital income of non-
residents. The precondition for NN is also missing because neither supply
nor demand is fixed, and thus a penalty on the taxpayer is harmful. NN is
arbitrary and puts the interests of the home nation above all others. It is
contrary to world economic integration and prosperity. Today, it is rarely
considered as a viable alternative. Economic reality affirms the precondi-
tions for CEN. Only CEN, therefore, satisfies the criteria of efficiency.
Even if savings are more responsive to lower tax rates than demand is
to the lower costs, CEN may be the only solution. Economists suggest that
even assuming this possibility, CIN would not be a viable solution. 91 The
argument is that CIN is only workable with tax harmonization and uniform
rates. Where rates are not uniform, tax competition will have major effects
on the resource allocations across countries even though it may increase the
supply of capital, and nations who can will adopt resident taxation of capital
income to protect their economies even though in this case it would only be
a second-best alternative.
92
The truth of this conclusion, that countries are likely to adopt resident
principles, is strongly indicated by the practical effect that capital export has
on capital-exporting and capital-importing nations. Without considering the
tax effects, the capital-exporting nation experiences a large income loss due
to the loss of capital-produced income and the lower productivity of the
home countries' labor force resulting from decreases in capital,193 offset by
a small increase in the income from remaining capital.194
The capital-importing nation, on the other hand, has a large incentive
to lower its tax rate on non-resident capital in order to attract it. The host
experiences a large economic gain due to the additional income generated
' See A. Goolsbee, Investment Tax Incentives, 113 Q.J. ECON. 121 (1997). See gener-
ally, Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Comment on Peroni, Fleming and Shay, Getting Serious About
Curtailing Deferral of United States Tax on Foreign Source Income, 52 SMU L. Rev. 531,
534 n.16 (1999).
'9'See Taxation and Household Savings (OECD) (1994); TANZI, supra note 1, at 91.
There may be a negative impact on savings where tax rates are very high. Id.
"'t Razin & Sadka, supra note 182, at 75.
912 Id. at 71, 75.
" Though there is not perfect substitutability, empirical studies show that direct invest-
ment abroad reduces domestic investment levels, and foreign direct investment (imported)
increases domestic investment. See Hines & Rice, supra note 102, at 20. A recent study
concludes that capital export entails a loss for workers. See D. Rodrik and J. van Ypersele,
Capital Mobility, Distributive Conflict, and International Tax Coordination 1 (unpublished
paper), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w7150 (last visited August 19, 2001).
9 RICHMAN, supra note 164, at 17.
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by the imported capital and the increase in productivity of domestic labor
offset by a small decrease in the income from preexisting domestic capi-
tal. 195
Where the tax in country X and country Y is the same, the investor is
indifferent as to the location of her investment unless the rate of return be-
fore taxes is higher in Y than in X. Certainly, in that case, capital would
flow to Y from X because of greater returns, and this would be efficient
from the world's perspective. If the return would be less in Y than in X,
capital would stay in X, which would also be efficient.
But under the principles of tax competition, if only Y taxes and X does
not tax the income on exported capital, and Y's rate on domestic capital is
less than X's rate on domestic capital, then the rate of return on investment
in Y could be less than X before taxes and still produce a higher rate of re-
turn for the investor after taxes.196 Capital would flow from X to Y, but this
would not be efficient because capital would not be employed at its most
productive use. Therefore, CIN for savers "would be highly non-neutral
with respect to international capital flows. 197
Thus, only resident principles ensure that, in a non-harmonized world,
capital is efficiently allocated. This only means, however, that capital is
taxed to the extent it would have been in X by either X or Y, which is the
traditional approach of CEN. Equitable principles suggest, however, that
the tax base belongs to the home country to compensate it for loss of in-
come and potential for economic growth due to the loss of capital.
There is a corollary to the preceding analysis that focuses on the capi-
tal-importing country and the effects of a CIN analysis upon it. Oftentimes,
CIN is analyzed in terms of its effect on individual taxpayers, and its sup-
porters rely on the notion that economic activity conducted in a host coun-
try should be on a level playing field, that it should be subject to the same
tax levels as domestic host country enterprises.
CIN principles assume that capital income is fully taxed by the host
country in the same fashion as domestic capital. The efficiency conditions
of CIN break down, however, where the market does not follow the condi-
tion. In this case, the condition would be that capital income of non-
residents was taxed in the same way as residents. If this is not the case,
then following the theory will no longer guarantee its efficiency result. 198
As demonstrated, theories of tax competition indicate that nations
should tax residents on their worldwide capital income, and, equally as im-
portant, that these nations should not tax their non-residents at all on their
195 Id.
'9 Empirical studies confirm that TNCs are willing to receive a lower return on capital in
low tax jurisdictions. See Hines & Rice, supra note 102, at 12.
"' Id. at 8.
198 See, e.g., id. at 6.
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capital income.199 This is because in a world of competition for capital any
tax by a host nation on capital will typically be passed on to the borrower.
With capital mobility, capital will flow to low taxed jurisdictions. 20 ' Tax
competition implies that importing countries must lower their tax rates, and,
as long as they can still effectively tax their residents, this need be on non-
residents only. Assuming free capital mobility, if CIN principles are strictly
followed, all domestic capital will be exported, foreign investors will sup-
ply all of the capital needs, and capital income in general will be tax ex-
empt. 2  The logical result of CIN is a shift of the entire tax base to less
mobile factors, mainly labor.2°3
The world does not follow CIN principles in the taxation of capital in-
comes, even though studies show that large nations like the United States
204are not exposed to the same risk of capital flight as are small nations. Af-
ter all, capital needs to go where it is productive, and large nations use con-
siderable capital. Even so, the impact of tax competition on the taxation of
capital imports is understood by both large and small nations alike.
Worldwide, source taxation of capital income is on the decline, and in
many cases has been unilaterally eliminated. The OECD reports that in
general the countries that host the markets do not tax interest income on
euro-bonds and deposits.20 5 Withholding taxes on interest income has been
abolished in a number of major countries. Studies indicate that most
countries do not tax bank account interest, many do not tax securities, and
most tax dividends at a reduced rate. 07 The United States, the world's larg-
est capital importing nation, has followed this trend. In general, domestic
source interest from certain portfolio investments held by non-resident
aliens and foreign corporations is exempt from United States tax.208 Capital
gains of non-residents are also typically exempt.209
.99 Razin & Sadka, supra note 182, at 75.
200 League of Nations, Report on Double Taxation, supra note 147, at 8.
20" Razin & Sadka, supra note 182, at 69.
202 Id. Countries that have followed source only taxation of capital income have experi-
enced a severe flight of capital. This was the experience of several Latin American countries
which have traditionally adopted territorial taxation only. See HUFBAUER, supra note 6, at
67 n.9.
203 TANZI, supra note 1, at 14.
204 See HUFBAUER, supra note 6, at 66 n.7.
25 Mitsuhiro Fukao & Mesaharu Hanazaki, Internationalization of Financial Markets and
the Allocation of Capital, 8 ECON. STUDIES 35 (OECD 1987).
206 TANZI, supra note 1, at 131.
207 See Fukao & Hanazaki, supra note 205, at 35.
211 See 26 U.S.C. § 87 1(h) (1994) (referring to individual portfolio interest); 26 U.S.C. §
87 1(i) (1994) (referring to individual deposits); 26 U.S.C. § 88 1(c) (1994) (referring to for-
eign corporation portfolio interest).
209 See 26 U.S.C. § 871 (1994) (indicating that capital gains are not included in the in-
come of non-resident aliens under § 871). Moreover, since the passage of § 865, the capital
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Several conclusions are warranted. World practice demonstrates that
source-only taxation does not achieve CIN objectives of efficiency because
nations regularly relinquish taxation over the capital income of non-
residents. Foreign capital simply does not compete on a "level playing
field" with domestic capital. This practical state of affairs is driven by the
economic truth that CIN is an unsatisfactory way of allocating the world's
supply of capital. Capital export neutrality is the only starting point in in-
ternational tax for promoting efficiency in capital allocation.
CEN is satisfied as long as the rate of tax on exported capital is the
home country's rate. Equity to the individual taxpayer is satisfied as long
as she is not subject to double taxation. These objectives would be satisfied
with either resident-based taxation or, generally, with dual taxation, resi-
dence and source, with the host's rate being no greater than the home's, and
with a foreign tax credit allowed by the home. These objectives, however,
would not be satisfied by the exemption of foreign-source income due to
the possibility that nations do not tax, or only tax lightly, non-resident capi-
tal income. Resident taxation, with a foreign tax credit, that allocates the
tax between the states according to the decision of the host, however, does
not achieve inter-nation equity.
This may not seem to be a very important question to a world that sees
the steady deterioration of source-based capital taxation. But some, like the
OECD, have taken positions opposed to this trend and have encouraged an
increase in source-based taxation.21 ° This course of action does comply
with CEN theory. It does not, however, take cognizance of the economic
forces behind the trend, nor does it accomplish the equitable treatment of
nations by allocating the tax base fairly. An optimal system should be effi-
cient, it should take into consideration the practicalities of capital-importing
and capital-exporting nations, it should be equitable to individual taxpayers
and it should be equitable to nations and their taxpayers.
D. Equitable International Taxation of Capital
Exclusive home country taxation of capital is clearly established when
one focuses on the home nation and its right to tax its residents' total in-
come. 211 The taxpayer receives many benefits as a person because the tax-
payer is that nation's own. There is wide agreement that a nation has the
right to tax its residents on their total income because their rights to the pro-
tection and services provided by the state are matched by their duties to the
state, among which is the duty to pay taxes.212
gains of non-resident alien individuals would not typically be sourced within the United
States. 26 U.S.C. § 865(a)(2) (1994).
210 HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION, supra note 62, at 2 1.
21 HUFBAUER, supra note 6, at 65.
212 HANS KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 75 (Anders Wedberg trans., Rus-
sell & Russell 1961).
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It is the resident country that has the meritorious case to tax income on
a comprehensive basis solely on account of the taxpayer's ability to pay be-
cause that country's obligations to its residents and citizens are not depend-
ent on that taxpayer's actual ability to pay for them. Thus, equity to home
nations and all of their residents places the tax base for capital income ex-
clusively within the domain of the home country, and this fully comports,
and indeed it informs the judgment, with the econormic theories and reali-
ties.
The equity of CIN is the equity of the exchange theory, which is the
only theory justifying piecemeal, source-based taxation.21 3 The host may
tax in accordance with the benefit the host confers on the investor. The
benefit conferred on the taxpayer by the host in terms of government goods
and services, however, is small in comparison to the good that the tax-
payer's capital showers on the host. The source country confers the benefit
of the protection and maintenance of the particular income source.214 The
services provided are the legal provisions that protect the investment and
the infrastructure, mainly the stock and other financial exchanges that may
facilitate the investment.21 5 Even proponents of CIN admit that the few
benefits the investor derives are not particularly important to her because
the investor simply will charge a premium for any enhanced risk.2t 6
Moreover, the host reaps a huge reward from the import of foreign
capital. The home suffers a large economic loss. Under an exchange theory
of taxation, the bargain between taxpayer and host is completely one-sided
in favor of the host. It is not, however, the individual taxpayer who suffers,
but the taxpayer's home nation.
Although the equity of CEN is the equity of taxation based on ability to
pay, it is also the equity of taxation based on benefit. Even under the bene-
fit theory of taxation, the capital-exporting nation deserves the exclusive
right to tax the income due to the positive contribution it has made to the
world order.
By providing governmental policies, institutions and laws, nations fos-
ter the development of capital, skills and technologies. The home has pro-
vided benefits to its resident with respect to her capital. Home nations
merit the tax base on capital income because it "creates the economic cli-
mate favorable to the creation of portfolio capital by practicing public fiscal
virtue and by nurturing private thrift., 217 The benefit provided by the home
state was "the historical costs to the nation involved in the accumulation of
213 See TILLINGHAST, supra note 173, at 3; Richman, supra note 164, at 16.
24 League of Nations, supra note 148, at 41 (citing Report of the Royal Commission on
Income Tax, 1920, Cmd. 615 (London: H.M Stationary Office 1920)).
215 These could more appropriately be paid for by user charges.
26 Vogel, supra note 184, at 316.
217 HUFBAUER, supra note 6, at 67.
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capital., 218 In a sense, the nation as a whole may be said to have created the
property.1 9 Since the home nation's capital produced the income, the in-
come from that capital belongs to the home, which is ultimately responsible
for the production of this value. Thus, the home's meritorious conduct
should be rewarded by assigning to it the exclusive right to tax.
Thus, ideally, capital income should be taxed on the basis of residence
only. That means that the home country may choose whether or not to tax
capital income as its policy dictates, but if it does tax capital income, it
should neither allow an exemption for exported capital nor a foreign tax
credit.
Although it is inappropriate for the source country to tax capital in-
come at all, those countries will still be free to do so. But this is not a ca-
lamity for the world, or for individual taxpayers. In the first place, it is
highly unlikely nations will do so because source taxation will increase the
cost of capital to the importing nation. That is because the additional cost
to the lender will no longer be subsidized by some home's foreign tax
credit.220 Either the additional cost would be passed on to borrowers,or the
capital would simply not be invested there. Thus, economic reality would
necessitate appropriate tax behavior and the proof is that even in a world
where international taxation favors taxation by hosts, the trend is away from
taxation of nonresident capital income.
In a sense, this system would empower nations. To the extent that a
nation perceived foreign capital to be a detriment to its societies, it could
discourage foreign capital simply by taxing it. The result would be either a
higher cost of capital to borrowers in the host country or less capital in the
host country, creating a positive externality for other nations, for capital
would seek more productive uses and locations.221 The foreign tax credit of
home countries thwarts this policy by preventing its appropriate economic
effect.
V. INTERNATIONAL TAXATION OF BUSINESS: THE SOLUTION
The prior discussion addressed the question of optimal taxation of
capital in such a way that it did not specifically examine it in light of capi-
tal's role in business. When one turns to business activities, however, one
is confronted with a whole new set of considerations.
FPI connotes the foreign investment of capital by individuals and busi-
nesses. FDI connotes the foreign use of capital in that taxpayer's trade or
business. FPI investors look to countries where they can get the best return
218 Richman, supra note 164, at 23.
219 Id.
220 Source countries that tax bear the cost of their tax when home countries do not tax for-
eign source capital income.
221 Wilson, supra note 55, at 275.
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on their money, taking into consideration the relevant risks. FPI users are
interested in where they can get the best return on their assets. FDI users
have more complicated motives, exporting capital to access markets and re-
sources, and to maintain their competitive advantage. With FPI, a tax ad-
vantage is often sufficient to attract capital to a foreign investment. Thus,
nations are quick to give up source-based taxation for the benefit of im-
ported capital. A FDI of capital in a country in which that capital is in-
tended to be used would rarely be made solely for the tax advantages.
There are many important cost factors that go into the decision to locate
business activity in a particular place. Tax is, however, becoming one of
the more important factors. That is why source nations' approach to the ex-
ercise of tax jurisdiction presents a much more complex picture.
Most studies before the 1990s found that the tax implications of for-
eign investment were a relatively minor consideration in most FDI deci-
sions.222  By contrast, studies since 1990 have indicated that tax is
becoming an increasingly important factor in locational decisions."' Re-
cent quantitative evidence indicates that investment and financing is quite
sensitive to tax treatment 224 because of the increasing mobility of the factors
of production, which yields a wide range of choices to business taxpay-
ers. While this is particularly true in the financial service sector, manu-
facturing as well has become much more export-oriented, and
correspondingly more sensitive to tax rates.226  Proponents of CIN and
source-based tax rationalize their approach on the simple basis that these
approaches are the only pragmatic solutions. Such analysts believe that
FDI will flow to low tax regimes despite what the developed countries do,
and since companies will take advantage of the opportunities of low tax and
gain the competitive advantage, it might as well be ours.227
CIN stresses practical fairness to business taxpayers. Its principle has
been persuasively summarized as follows: fairness requires that "a taxpayer
who conducts an enterprise in another country - or market - and thus util-
izes the other country's facilities (public goods) can be sure of being taxed
no more than anyone else who, under the same circumstances, uses these
facilities to the same extent." 228 Moreover, the justification for source taxa-
tion of business income on the basis of benefits received by the taxpayer is
much stronger in the case of a business enterprise conducted in a foreign
222 EASSON, supra note 96, at 12.
223 COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF
INDEPENDENT EXPERTS ON COMPANY TAXATION, at 115 (Luxembourg 1992).
224 Hines & Rice, supra note 102, at 41.
221 EASSON, supra note 96, at 17.
226 Id. at 18.
227 HUFBAUER, supra note 6, at 58-59.
221 Vogel, supra note 184, at 314.
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country. Such an enterprise is typically more interested in governmental
goods and services than the FPI investor.229
Two arguments detract from the weight of this argument. First, inter-
national business benefits considerably from government goods and ser-
vices provided by the home country as well as those provided by the host,
so benefit analysis is not determinative on which country should have the
right to the tax bases or as to how much.23 °
Second, under an exchange theory of taxation, the host country has
benefited in many ways through the importation of a business and its capi-
tal. This includes all the advantages of having imported capital,231 includ-
ing increased employment. In addition, businesses import other assets,
including new skills and technology that can lead to the increased produc-
tivity of the local economy. In particular, highly skilled personnel contrib-
ute disproportionately to their wage value to an economy's growth rate. 32
Thus, advanced technology, expertise, embodied knowledge and highly
skilled labor all provide many positive externalities to the host. That is why
host nations are eager to attract foreign business activity, even when they
need to use tax preferences and subsidies to do so.
233
These large gains to the host economies represent large potential eco-
nomic losses to the home economy. As in the case of FPI, FDI removes
capital from the home country. In addition to the effects of FPI, FDI also
exports technology and labor that might have been utilized in the home
country and which could have contributed greatly to the growth rate in the
home country. The utilization of invention and technology and the talents
of highly skilled workers ma each be more important to the economic suc-
cess of a nation than capital.
Thus, the conflicting objectives of CEN and CIN, and a conflict be-
tween individual equity and inter-nation equity and economic efficiency
confront international taxation of business income. To some, both econo-
mists and legal scholars, there is no correct solution since CEN and CIN are
mutually exclusive and cannot be reconciled. 235 A second approach is to
accept that both have important yet competing objectives, and a balance
229 See Vogel, supra note 184, at 313. One author suggests that where tax monies are put
into infrastructure rather than redistribution, the source country should have the exclusive
right to tax. See Stephens, supra note 94, at 159.
230 See Richman, supra note 164, at 16.
23 See discussion supra note 196.
232 See TANZI, supra note 1, at 35; Assaf Razin & Chi-Wa Yuen, Understanding the Prob-
lem or Economic Development: The Role of Factor Mobility and International Taxation, at
21, at http://www.nber.org/papers/w7l15 (last visited August 19, 2001).
131 See HUFBAUER, supra note 6, at 67-68.
234 Robert E. Hall & Charles I. Jones, Why Do Some Countries Produce So Much More
Output Per Worker Than Others? 114 Q.J. ECON. 83, 83-84 (1999).
... EASSON, supra note 96, at 11; JEFFERY, supra note 136, at 6.
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should be struck.236 These have tried to separate these concepts pragmati-
cally, asserting an approach of relative neutrality even while fully aware of
the theoretical problem of relativism.
237
Finally, there are those economists and legal scholars who have con-
cluded that one concept of economic efficiency is the optimal solution.
Those economists supporting CEN are in the considerable majority.2 38 Few
support CIN, 39 but there is substantial support for CIN among lawyers and
in the business community.240 Neither articulated solution is totally satis-
factory because, under present analysis, CIN sacrifices equity to home
countries, whereas CEN places home country enterprises at a competitive
disadvantage. Also, CIN is based on what is now appearing to be a faulty
premise that host nations actually tax foreign concerns on their domestic-
sourced income where in fact the landscape is littered with jurisdictional
thresholds for source taxation, tax preferences and low tax regimes for non-
residents.
Though current thought is based on reasoned discourse, an examina-
tion of the principles and purposes of economic efficiency, equity and prac-
tical necessity leads to an understanding that CIN and CEN are not
mutually exclusive, but each is an essential element of one theory of opti-
mal international taxation. This theory is, simply, that CEN is a moment of
a reconstituted CIN approach to optimal international taxation.
This statement should cause puzzlement to anyone who is aware of my
conclusion that CEN is the optimal theory for the taxation of capital. What
is being suggested here is that part of the problem of assessing CIN and
CEN principles is that an assumption has been made about their implica-
tions that is simply incorrect. The dialogue has assumed that CEN leads to
residence-based, worldwide taxation of income. It is also assumed that CIN
is established solely through the territorial taxation of income. Neither
proposition is correct.
CIN and CEN, as their very terms advertise, deal with taxation and the
efficient allocation of capital. Economic proofs have been directed at estab-
lishing which nation should have the right to tax the income from capital.
Apparently without explanation, it has been assumed that these concepts
apply as well to other kinds of income. It is time to determine why.
236 Vogel, supra note 184, at 319-20; Horst, supra note 180, at 798.
237 JEFFERY, supra note 136, at 8-9.
238 See, e.g., Vogel, supra note 184.
239 Id.
240 See International Chamber of Commerce, Avoidance of Double Taxation, Exemption
v. Tax Credit Method, RESOLUTION OF ICC COUNCIL AND REPORT OF COMMISSION OF
TAXATION (Feb. 1955); BIAC, supra note 79, at 1; see also Klaus Vogel, Worldwide vs.
Source Taxation of Income - A Review and Re-evaluation of Arguments (Part 1), 8-9
1NTERTAX 216, 221.-222 (1988).
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CEN is a theory of capital allocation, which seeks the efficient alloca-
tion of capital between nations. Taxation should be the same whether capi-
tal is invested at home or abroad so that the decision to invest domestically
or in foreign countries will not be affected by tax considerations. As
pointed out above, this rationale has been shown to be determinative in es-
tablishing the home's right to tax. Moreover, inter-nation equity has estab-
lished that this is an exclusive right.
The economic case for CIN has consistently been made in terms of the
fair and efficient treatment of business income, the rational being that a for-
eign enterprise should be on the same tax basis as domestic enterprises in
the host state. Commentators fail to analyze what this really means. Does
it mean that host states have the exclusive right to tax all income territori-
ally situated within its borders?
Source jurisdiction is not a matter of naked power because jurisdiction
based on power no longer makes sense in open economies striving for the
benefits of free trade and enhanced factor mobility. Source jurisdiction in-
stead is a matter of economic allegiance; there must be an economic
foundation for the assertion of source jurisdiction.24' This allegiance is
more than just a superficial context; there must be a just or equitable basis
for the assertion of such jurisdiction.
This article has established that CEN achieves the goal of efficiency
and that only residence taxation of capital income advances CEN and the
equitable division of the tax base for capital income. What this article will
also show is that this outcome is also fully compatible with the principles
and objectives of CIN. To fully appreciate this, one must apply the princi-
ples of capital taxation to the taxation of FDI.242
A. The Factors of Business Income
What prompts a business to engage in FDI? It is because the business
perceives that it has an economic advantage that it wishes to exploit. The
advantages and sources of the ultimate profits gained by engaging in FDI
can be capital, tangible and intangible assets including technical and indus-
try expertise, headquarters efficiencies and a skilled workforce. Much of
what a business is all about, and what its true value is, is attributable to its
intellectual capital. This value can often be the essence of a company's op-
erations.243 Thus, much of what a business exports is not cash or physical
assets, but intangible assets. Financial service enterprises illustrate this
241 See F.A. MANN, FURTHER STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 8-1 1, 14-15 (Clarendon,
Oxford 1990).
242 Hufbauer, who asserts CEN theory as the appropriate theory for the taxation of FPI,
questions its relevance to FDI because capital flows are dominated by FPI. See HUFBAUER,
supra note 6, at 60.
243 OECD online, Intellectual Capital (Paris, June 2, 1999), at
http://www.oecd.org/news/release/nn99-54a.htm (last visited Aug. 19, 2001).
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principle well, for "what is really exported consists principally of embodied
knowledge and skilled labor.
2 44
Thus, income is derived internationally by businesses from factor in-
puts including capital, tangible assets and intangible assets. Income is also
derived from the labor, environment, infrastructure and public benefits of
the country in which the various activities are carried out. Which country
can be said to be the source of the income based on the economic affinity of
the income to the local? Which country has the meritorious case to tax?
Following the lead of our previous analysis, the country that is the source of
the assets that provides the income-producing value should get the exclu-
sive right to tax. This is both CIN and CEN,2" or more expansively stated,
Value Export Neutrality, and Value Import Neutrality.
B. Redefining the Source Rules
The key to understanding what is wrong with the present approach to
international tax is found in an examination of how income is actually
sourced. Though the importance of actually allocating income to particular
jurisdictions is critical to CIN advocates and practical international taxation,
consideration of rules is rare. "The idea that income has a locatable source
seems to be taken for granted, but the source of income is not a well-
defined economic idea." 46 As pointed out in a special report of the Ameri-
can Law Institute:
There has never been a comprehensive rationale for the source rules that now
exist, either in the United States or elsewhere; and it is difficult, if not impossi-
ble, to articulate generally valid and neutral principles for assigning a geo-
graphic source to income. The process seems, however, to require a balancing
of the strength of conflicting claims and considerations as they apply to par-
ticular types of income.
24 7
Adding to this confusion, one learns that the rules on source often seek
to implement different objectives that lead to inconsistent source rules.248
Where countries tax both on the basis of residence and source, the rules do
double duty, determining both the domestic source for nonresidents in order
to tax and the foreign source for residents in order to provide appropriate re-
244 INGO WALTER, GLOBAL COMPETITION IN FINANCIAL SERVICES: MARKET STRUCTURE,
PROTECTION AND TRADE LIBERALIZATION 106 (Harper Business 1988).
245 The principles of CEN apply to any factor input that is internationally mobile. See
RAZIN & YUEN, supra note 134, at 68 n.12.
216 AULT & BRADFORD, supra note 163, at 30 (Assaf Razin and Joel S. Pemrod, eds.,
Univ. of Chicago Press 1990).
247 AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 137, at 42.
248 United States Dep't of Treas., International Tax Reform: An Interim Report 1 (Jan.
1993).
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lief from double taxation. These rules can reflect nations' differing views
on practicalit,, preservation of the tax base, efficiency and ensuring com-
petitiveness.249 Sometimes domestic source will be dictated because of the
perception that others are not taxing the income in question.2' ° Thus, some
nations apply different standards for residents and nonresidents.
251
The approach to defining source also differs among nations. One
method is to take a systematic approach and define the source of income in
statutory rules. 252 A second approach determines rules on courts' case-by-
case analysis.253 A third approach leaves sourcing to the decisions of ad-
ministrative officials.254 Considering the lack of economic guidance on in-
come location and the conflicting objectives of nations, it should not be
surprising that "complexity and arbitrariness are hard to avoid. 255
The difficulty is that tax jurisdiction traditionally was strictly territo-
rial. Modem thought and practice today seeks an economic reason for taxa-
tion, that is, that the income in question benefits from its location,
especially in terms of government goods and services. Therefore, it is in-
correct to try to find a strictly territorial income location. Moreover, find-
ing such a territorial location is becoming less and less possible.256
Source rules can be studied and delineated from the same perspective
that illustrated that capital exporting countries have the exclusive right to
tax the income from their residents' capital, wherever it is derived. From
this systematic treatment of appropriate capital income taxation on the basis
of economic efficiency, fairness to taxpayers and fairness to nations, a
model for source taxation can be derived.
The starting point for providing a rationale for the taxation of interest
income today is that its source is where the money is used, for that is the
place where capital is producing income and that is the place whose laws
protect its use. Though this approach appears straightforward, its en-
249 Id. at 2-3.
2
50 Id. at 30.
21 The United States applies the same standard. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 861, 862, 863, 865.
252 The United States follows this approach. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 861, 862, 863, 865.
253 Australia, for example, uses this approach. See J.S. Lockhart, Australia, in 65b
STUDIES ON INTERNATIONAL FISCAL LAW, RULES FOR DETERMINING INCOME AND EXPENSES
AS DOMESTIC OR FOREIGN 211 (1980).
254 See Ignace Claeys, Belgium, in 65b STUDIES ON INTERNATIONAL FISCAL LAW, RULES
FOR DETERMINING INCOME AND EXPENSES AS DOMESTIC OR FOREIGN, supra note 253, at 277,
288.
255 See Ault & Bradford, supra note 163, at 31.
256 For example, with the growth of Internet commerce, which utilizes devices such as
smart money and wire transfers, it will become increasingly more difficult to determine the
location of the economic activity.
257 Argentina is an example of this approach. See Juan Carlos Visshi, Argentina, in 65b
STUDIES ON INTERNATIONAL FISCAL LAW, RULES FOR DETERMINING INCOME AND EXPENSES
AS DOMESTIC OR FOREIGN, supra note 253, at 171, 172.
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forcement assumes that there is a measurable amount of capital that actually
can be located in a particular country. 258
Of all the sourcing rules, it is nearly impossible to try to directly locate
money in a world where investors are free to move, and in fact do move,
their capital often to take advantage of the highest returns. Thus, nations
typically choose surrogate principles of sourcing income that attempt to in-
directly access the substance of what was quite difficult to get at directly.
Under one rule, the source of the interest income depends on the residence
of the debtor, which may work reasonably well as a principle determining
the place of use in the case of many individual borrowers, but in the case of
business, may not. Under a second rule the interest income source depends
on the place to which the principle is made available. A third rule considers
the place to which interest payments are made. Finally, a fourth rule con-
siders the place of residence of the bank through which interest payments
are made."9 The likelihood that most of these rules would actually link the
income to a country where the money was used is small.
Moreover, the source country's right to tax interest, if ever exercised,
is often limited or eliminated. The United States Model Treaty allows only
residence taxation of interest income. 260 The OECD Model Treaty and the
U.N. Model provides limited source taxation of interest income with re-
duced rates.
2 6
As shown above, however, it is not the physical location of the money
that gives a nation the right to tax, but the benefit provided to the transac-
tion. When one can't even determine where the money actually is, how can
one argue that a particular host has provided any benefits. Assuming a lo-
catable use, the host has not provided any demonstrable benefits to the tax-
payer. The home country, however, has provided many to its resident as
262resident and to its resident as capital owner.
The argument for allocating the taxation of the normal return from
moneyed capital to the home country applies equally to physical assets.
Though the objectives of FDI may be different, an appropriate economic as-
sumption is that there is "[p]erfect substitutability between physical and fi-
nancial capital. 2 63 Imported capital assets represent value exported from
home countries. This value was added to the world by enterprises resident
28 See Ault & Bradford, supra note 163, at 33.
259 Vogel, supra note 240, at 227.
260 United States Model Income Convention of September 20, 1996, United States Dep't
of Treas., Article 11.
26 Articles of the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital (June 30,
1998);, Article 11; United Nations, United Nations Model Double Taxation Convention Be-
tween Developed and Developing Countries 121-137 (1980).
262 See text at supra notes 193-97.
263 RAZIN AND YUEN, supra note 134, at n.4.
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in the home. The fair market value of these assets when exported represents
capital originating in the home.
The same economic principles of CEN and CIN apply to assets as well.
Neutrality requires that the choice of whether to use assets at home or
abroad should be unaffected by tax considerations. Equity among govern-
ments requires the assignment of the tax base exclusively to the home be-
cause its meritorious conduct provides the environment for the production
of the goods, its economy suffers a large loss in income and jobs on account
of its export, and the host benefits greatly, disproportionately to the benefit
it provides.
. Present rules for sourcing tangible assets are the most arbitrary.
Source often begins with the characterization of a transaction as a sale or a
lease. Sales are sourced under several theories. Two possible theories,
which source sales at the place where negotiation occurred or the place
where title passed, leave all countries largely at the whim of the taxpayer.264
Some rules already source income at the residence of the owner. The
United States sources non-inventory sales in the country of the seller's resi-
dence.2 65 The United States also sources a sale of manufactured goods in
the residence country to the extent of the fair market value of the goods at
the border.266
Leasing, on the other hand, is sourced at the place where the property
is used. 67 Since physical assets can typically be easily located, there is no
need to rely on a surrogate or indirect approach to sourcing.
Thus, even though the sale of an asset for fair market value is eco-
nomically equivalent to the lease of that asset, form controls the allocation
of the tax base.268 The weight of the country of residence's claim is such
that it has been proposed that the source of rental income be the residence
of the lessor.269
It is only this latter rule, sourcing lease payments on the basis of the
residence of the lessor, which would effectuate a policy of assigning the
normal return on capital to the country of residence. To see this, one must
realize that there are two tax incidents that must be examined. The first is
directed at the business operating in a host country that is treated as a sepa-
2" See Robert J. Patrick, Jr., General Report, in 65b STUDIES ON INTERNATIONAL FISCAL
LAW, RULES FOR DETERMINING INCOME AND EXPENSES AS DOMESTIC OR FOREIGN, supra note
253, at 15, 21.
265 26 U.S.C. § 865 (1994).
266 See Visshi, supra note 257, at 174; American Law Institute, supra note 137, at 65-68.
267 See Patrick, supra note 264, at 24. See also 26 U.S.C. § 861(a)(4) (1994).
266 See HarryGrubert & T. Scott Newlon, The International Implications of Consumption
Tax Proposals, 48 NAT'L TAX J. 619, 623 n.9 (1995).
269 COMMITTEE ON FISCAL AFFAIRS, OECD, TRENDS IN INTERNATIONAL TAXATION 13-14
(1985).
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rate taxpayer under international principles (permanent establishment).270
The second is directed at the business as a nonresident that is treated as any
investor, either selling or leasing property to the permanent establishment.
Where lease payments would be considered sourced according to the les-
sor's residence, the income on the capital invested, based on the fair market
value of the capital good when exported, would be allocated solely to the
home. Looking first to the permanent establishment, it does not pay tax on
the normal return generated by the asset because it is deducting its expendi-
ture for lease payments. Deduction of these current expenses shifts income
from the payor to the payee. The deductible payment represents the inves-
tor's return of capital and normal return on capital. Since the investor's in-
come would not be sourced in the host, the normal return on the capital,
based on the fair market value of the asset when imported, would be exempt
from host country tax.
Sourcing lease payments in the host changes the previous analysis. Al-
though the treatment of the permanent establishment would be the same, the
treatment of the investor would be different. The rent payments would now
be income subject to host tax. The host would normally allow the taxpayer
depreciation deductions to allow for the portion of the asset used up, but if
all that is allowed is economic depreciation, then the normal return on the
Investor's capital is fully subject to host taxation. Accelerated depreciation
(in excess of economic depreciation) allowed by the host would work as a
partial relinquishment of the host's traditional source tax base.
Surprisingly, the investor's sale of the asset to the permanent estab-
lishment does not cure the problem of the host's unwarranted source juris-
diction even assuming that it is not host source. From the investor's
perspective, if she receives full payment, she is free of host taxation on the
value of its asset, and hence, its normal return on capital. The permanent
establishment, however, now pays the tax.
The permanent establishment receives income through the use of the
asset, which is fully subject to host tax. If the permanent establishment
only receives economic depreciation, it is being taxed on the normal return
on its capital invested in the asset, which is really the return of the foreign
investor who put up the capital. If the permanent establishment financed
the asset acquisition, its ability to deduct the interest shifts the tax on the as-
set's normal return to the creditor. If the creditor was the investor, then the
normal return is sourced under the traditional interest rules in the host.
Thus, the difference between a sale without a host resident financing and a
lease assuming the host exercises its full source taxation, is simply which
aspect of the taxpayer, the investor or the permanent establishment, pays the
tax. Only where the permanent establishment borrows the purchase price
270 See, e.g., OECD Model Tax Convention, supra note 261, Article 9(2).
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from an unrelated party does the normal return on the asset escape host
country taxation.
Intangible assets also represent taxpayer-owned capital or value. As
such, the principles developed herein that are applicable to the taxation of
capital apply equally to intangible capital. Economic efficiency dictates the
same outcome. One economist, concluding that the case for residence
based taxation is so compelling, has coined a special term, "Technology
Export Neutrality" ("TEN"). 71 In keeping with CEN principles, the deci-
sion to use technology at home or abroad should not be affected by tax con-
siderations. Without equal home country taxation of the income from
intangibles whether used at home or abroad, taxpayers will be driven by
lower tax rates to use their intangible elsewhere.
The issue of which country is entitled to the income produced by in-
tangible property and the appropriate source of that income may be much
more controversial than in the case of capital and tangible assets. Under
current principles, intangible property is treated the same as tangible, that
is, where intangibles are leased or sold for an amount contingent on produc-
tivity and use, royalties are sourced where used or, indirectly, according to
the residence of the lessee-purchaser. 27 2 Both the United States Model
Treaty and the OECD Model Treaty reverse the effect of this rule and pro-
vide for residence-based tax of royalty income only.2"3 The U.N. model
suggests that the host country should tax royalty income only at a limited
rate.274
The case for sourcing royalty income like a sale of any other asset to
the residence of the seller/lessor is quite logical.27 5 This is because the fair
market value of the property at the time of the export is equal to the presentv r 276
value of the expected return over the life of the property. The argument
for host country taxation is based on the benefit derived by the taxpayer
from the host country. The host provides the legal protection under which
the intangible is being exploited. This, of course, is only significant in
the case of legally protected assets like patents and trademarks.
Once again, however, the benefit reaped by the host is disproportionate
to the detriment it suffers. Along with all of the positive effects associated
with the importation of capital, such as the gain in income from imported
capital and the increase in employment, technology import has a spillover
271 HUFBAUER, supra note 6, at 95-98.
272 See 26 U.S.C. §§ 861(2)(4), 862 (1994). See also AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra
note 137, at 91.
2 United States Model Convention, supra note 261, Article 12(i), OECD Model Tax
Convention, supra note 261, Article 12(i).
274 See UNITED NATIONS, supra note 261, at 138-148.
275 Grubert & Newlon, supra note 268, at 623 n.9.
276 Id.
277 AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 137, at 80.
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effect that benefits others who did not incur the expenditure and develop the
technology.278 Successful technology, the only kind exported, typically
earns amounts greatly exceeding a normal return on the capital invested in
that particular asset. This gain in income and employment is the home na-
tion's loss.
The case for exclusive home country taxation of the income produced
by intangibles is even stronger than in the case of income from moneyed
capital and tangible assets. Many commercial enterprises are heavy users of
intangible capital. 79 Statisticians estimate that the value of intangible capi-
280tal to business may be as high as one-third of all assets.
Intangible capital includes not only assets like patents, trademarks and
trade secrets, but also includes good will, customer service and relations,
sales expertise, production, headquarters efficiencies and profits lost to es-
tablish markets, including all of the training and skills acquired by a work-
force.2 81 Many costs associated with the creation of intangible assets are
expensed under most income tax systems, principally those for R&D, work-
force development, education and training and advertising. Expensing, or
taking a deduction for the full cost of a long-lived asset, is the equivalent of
exempting from taxation all of the income produced by that asset.282 Where
the asset is used in the country in which it is produced, taxing the actual in-
come generated by the intangible makes up for the immediate deduction of
the costs and the government ends up even, owning zero net tax, assuming a
normal return. But if income from the intangible assets is not fully taxed
because the home country's tax system defers in some manner to the host
country's tax system, then the home country suffers a loss and has provided
a second full tax incentive to exported intangibles only.2 83 This second tax
incentive becomes a subsidy to the host, or an assignment of tax to the host,
when the host taxes the intangible income.
The loss to the home is actually much larger than this simple explana-
tion would indicate. Enterprises often invest in the development of intangi-
ble assets that prove to be short-lived or worthless. When R&D or
278 Don Fullerton & Andrew B. Lyon, Tax Neutrality and Intangible Capital, 2 TAX
POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 1988 at 63, 66 (1988).
279 Id. at 65.
20 Id. at 74.
2I1 Id. at 72; HUFBAUER, supra note 6, at 86-90.
262 "If the statutory rate is constant, the marginal effective tax rate is zero on intangible
capital because an immediate deduction for the outlay is equivalent in present value to ex-
empting from tax all future income generated from the asset." Fullerton & Lyon, supra note
278, at 67.
23 The United States system now requires that the expense for R&D be allocated between
United States and foreign source income, 26 U.S.C. § 864(f) (1994). This has no relevance
for host country taxation of United States enterprises, but only has relevance to the United
States foreign tax credit.
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advertising does not succeed, these enterprises do not earn even a normal
return on their capital investment. On the other hand, when R&D succeeds,
taxpayers often earn many times the normal return on their capital invest-
ments. Allowing current deductions for the cost associated with intangibles
places the government in the role of a joint venturer with the taxpayer, shar-
ing the losses through giving up tax revenues and gaining a larger tax with
highly successful endeavors.
This view is the opposite of conventional wisdom on the subject.284
The American Law Institute views the licensing of intangibles for contin-
gent consideration as a joint venture between licensee and licensor, where
the licensor shares in the business success of the one who uses the asset.285
Though a fixed sale price for the fair market value of the asset may be diffi-
cult to determine in the case of technology, that fact does not detract from
the fact that contingent prices are property market values. It is the market
that establishes the contingent price as the normal return. This value was
added to the world by the home's system, and only the home, which has put
up its tax capital, and not the host, which puts up nothing to develop the in-
tangible, is a joint venturer in the undertaking and is entitled to the normal
return on expenditures and their value.
Exemption of the return on intangibles by the host, which is the eco-
nomic equivalent of expensing the cost of producing technology, also satis-
fies the purpose behind CIN by providing the same stimulus to increase
technology's world supply by exempting imported as well as domestic
technology income. Host country taxation of technology-produced income
would be economically inefficient because it would discriminatorily favor
domestic technology where the host had provided any incentive to its de-
velopment. Thus, host taxation of the normal income from intangibles is
non-neutral and discriminatory. Host country taxation would clearly be
poaching the benefit the home country has provided to the world, since the
home country provided a subsidy for its development.
Thus, even under a CIN principle, what one would be recognizing is
that territorially, the source of income derived from the use of a host coun-
try enterprise for capital, tangible and intangible assets, and related services
or assets such as know-how or show how should be attributable to the home
country as the place responsible for its creation. 286 It is the home country's
infrastructure, laws, educational system and people that provided value to
284 See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 137, at 80.
285 Id.
216 It should come as quite a surprise that the principle proponent of CIN in the legal
community, Klaus Vogel, supports this idea fully. He stated: "Viewed under the aspects of
economic efficiency, not of equity, it cannot really be doubted that the value of an immate-
rial good or know-how has been produced in the country of the head enterprise, and, there-
fore, should be taxable there, even if realized in another country." Vogel, supra note 184, at
320.
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enterprises and fostered the creation of the factors that led to the income.
The home has promoted capital formation, skill acquisition and asset and
technology transfer. CIN principles are satisfied when we consider a for-
eign enterprise located in the host that is required to purchase or acquire all
such things abroad. It is irrelevant whether that enterprise in the host coun-
try is foreign or domestic; to the extent it acquires assets from abroad, it
must pay value for them. Neither the enterprise located in the host, nor the
investor resident in the home states, should be taxed on the normal return
on these assets.
So far, the discussion has only directly considered activity that either
was between strangers or that was taxed as if it were between strangers on
an arms-length basis. These principles, however, apply with equal weight
to equity capital. There is no sufficient economic difference between the
ordinary return on debt and the ordinary return on equity capital. Though
interest income from debt already receives practical treatment close to the
ideal suggested herein, that is deductible by the user in the host and tax ex-
empt or nearly exempt for the nonresident owner, equity investments do not
receive such practical treatment. Under general principles, the return on
equity is not deductible by the business user. This includes the normal re-
turn on invested capital, whether cash or the fair market value of tangible
and intangible assets imported to the host and contributed to the activity.
As previously stated, economic depreciation allowed by the host sim-
ply provides for a recovery of the capital investment but assigns all income
to the host. This assumes that economic depreciation would be based on
the fair market value of the property when imported.287 Were the deprecia-
tion based on less, the host taxes an amount of income that exceeds the
amount of income that could even arguably be determined as having been
earned in the host. Also, where the enterprise is in corporate form, repatri-
ated earnings in the form of dividends paid to nonresidents are often subject
to withholding taxes in the host country (though such taxes are often sub-
stantially reduced by treaty).
Capital Gains on the sale of the business may be exempt, however.
Such taxation of corporations preserves classical economic double taxation
of corporate income even in those countries that have adopted integrated
corporate shareholder systems for their own residents. Not only is the nor-
mal return on capital taxed twice, but both taxes are assigned to the host.
As demonstrated, the normal return on capital belongs to the home's
tax base. Taxpayers, therefore, should receive a deduction for a reasonable
return on equity obtained from nonresidents. This could be accomplished
27 In the United States, for example, basis (tax cost) for depreciation of imported assets is
limited to historic cost. See Rev. Rul. 55-62, 1955-1 C.B. 212 (1955). This could distort the
allocation of income between home and host United States depending on whether the United
States allowed accelerated depreciation. See generally, Keith Engle, Importing Assets into
Domestic Taxing Jurisdiction: Learning from Canada, 52 TAx LAWYER 275 (1999).
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by treating cash equity as debt, and all assets, tangible and intangible, as
having been sold fully financed at their fair market value. Market interest,
deductible by the enterprise and exempt to the nonresident owner, would be
imputed to all capital. Alternatively, all assets could be treated as having
been leased, with the lease payments deductible to the user and exempt to
the non-resident owner.
In the case of a corporation, dividends, like interest, should be home
country source and exempt from host taxation. Thus, the normal return on
equity capital would be properly assigned away from the host to the home
country. The home country can tax the normal return on equity capital
without providing a foreign tax credit. Were market interest instead im-
puted to equity capital, the home could tax such currently.
What remains to the enterprise after deducting the normal return on the
income from these imported factor inputs is the income that is truly derived
in the host. This remaining income is produced by the factors associated
with the host country: its infrastructure, its skilled labor force and its capital
or other assets. Such income reflects the earnings on the value that the host
has added to the world. All contributions by the home have been accounted
for. What is left is economic rent, the income in excess of the costs and the
normal return on all assets. This economic rent is site-specific and must be
allocated to the host. As such, meritorious taxation belongs to the host ex-
clusively.
Conferring exclusive jurisdiction to the host over economic rents satis-
fies fully the purpose behind CEN and CIN. The decision to use capital in
any form, whether at home or abroad, is unaffected by tax because the nor-
mal return on the capital is taxed at home country rates. Capital is attracted
to the host, not because of its tax structure, but because of the greater return
on the investment. Capital finds its most profitable use that is economically
efficient. A greater return is found in the host because of the benefits it
provides to investment.
Equity, therefore, assigns the tax to the host due to its worthiness. This
system promotes sovereignty and self-determination as to tax policy. The
host may choose whether or not to tax and, if so, how much. The host de-
rives the benefit or suffers the consequence of its choices. If the host's tax
rate is lower than the home country or the norm among nations, the host has
given up revenue on the value its system has added in exchange for lower
prices for its residents and the rest of the world. If the host taxes more
heavily, it has increased the price of goods for the benefit of higher taxes
and increased public benefits. Vis-d.-vis the rest of the world, this is eco-
nomically efficient. The host poaches on no other nation's tax base, nor is
it permitted to steal excess tax from the home through the operation of the
foreign tax credit mechanism. Not only do we achieve inter-nation fairness,
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but also achieve taxpayer fairness since source and resident-based tax no
longer conflict.
288
There is a tension between the principles of residence taxation based
on ability to pay and the non-taxation by a home state of economic rents
earned in a host state. Home state's clearly appropriate goal of including
foreign-sourced economic rent in its tax base to protect the integrity of pro-
gressive principles should be recognized for its detrimental effect, true
poaching on the host's tax base.289 If resident states resolve this issue in fa-
vor of worldwide taxation, it should, at the least, provide a foreign tax
credit for this income only.
C. Source Taxation: A Consumption Tax Model
The allocation of the tax base on the basis of merit postulates that a
source nation's right to tax an activity is related to the economic value that
can be said to be created by a taxpayer attributable to that state's system. In
other words, it is the value added by an activity that can fairly be said to be
contributed to the world by a nation that is within the appropriate tax base
of that nation.
The use of a consumption tax term is not happenstance. What econom-
ics and equity confirm is that the portion of the income tax base that is ap-
propriate for source taxation is consumption. That is so because once one
has removed the normal return of capital from the tax base, what one has
left is consumption. 9 It is not suggested that host nations are limited to
product taxes like sales or value added tax, but that host nations can use
broad-based expenditure or business consumption taxes, sometimes referred
to as cash flow taxes.
The suggestion that a broad-based consumption tax is the appropriate
tax structure for international business income is not new. Indeed, several
have abl set forth its value and the basic principles under which it would
operate.
Past discourse concerning the consumption tax for international busi-
ness, however, has assumed the premise that consumption taxation would
28 There may still be conflicts between different nations of resident taxation, but any of
these today have been resolved by treaty.
29 Several nations maintain progressive principles often referred to as exclusion with
progression by including excluded foreign income in the tax base only for calculations. See
Vogel, supra note 240, at 218.
290 See HENRY C. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION: THE DEFINITION OF INCOME As
A PROBLEM OF FISCAL POLICY 50 (University of Chicago Press 1938).
291 See, e.g., Charles E. McClure, Jr., Substituting Consumption-Based Direct Taxation
for Income Taxes as the International Norm, 45 NAT'L TAX J. 145, 145 (1992).
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replace income taxation entirely as the international norm. 92 Whatever the
merits of such a proposal, it is not this author's object to reconcile nations'
different claims to income taxation by abolishing it. Instead, assuming the
continued reliance on income taxation, the question is, how can one resolve
the conflicting claims to this base? Unlike the view that consumption tax is
the most equitable basis of taxation for source taxation in a world where
consumption tax is the norm,293 the conclusion of this analysis is that con-
sumption tax is the most equitable and jurisdictionally appropriate income
294tax for source countries in a world adopting income taxation as the norm.
In general, the object of a business consumption tax is to tax the eco-
nomic rents accruing to a business venture. 295 An economic rent is the re-
turn on investment that is over and above the normal rate of return on
investment. This would be the income left after accounting for all costs, in-
cluding the return on all factor inputs.
There are several ways a consumption tax may be designed, and the
Meade Commission carried out much of the work.296 The basic R-type
model starts with a comprehensive income tax base and allows immediate
deductions for the costs of all materials, labor and fixed assets. Under the R
base, the recipient of interest and dividends is not taxed, whereas the payor
is not entitled to a deduction.2 97 The modified R & F type changes the
treatment of financial instruments. Loans (and equity) are deductible by the
creditor and included in the income of the debtor, and repayments are in-
come to the creditor and deductible by the debtor. 298 In both an R and an R
+ F system, flows of equity are ignored and are treated just as loans are in
an R system, meaning that dividends are not deductible. Thus, an advan-
tage of consumption tax systems is that all capital is treated equally; there
should be no critical difference between the treatment of inflows and out-
flows of debt or equity and their returns.
Though economically equivalent for most enterprises, there are differ-
ences in the actual results. Where the principle activity is banking, or an ac-
tivity in which the object is the income from the different returns on
borrowing and lending, then the R & F system, which treats interest re-
292 Id. See Grubert & Newlon, supra note 268; see also Peggy B. Musgrave, Substituting
Consumption-Based Direct Taxation for Income Taxes as the International Norm, 45 NAT'L
TAxJ. 179, 182 (1992).
293 McClure, supra note 291, at 149.
294 McClure did not address the problem of whether source or resident nations had the
right to tax capital income, stating, "Whether the normal return to capital should be taxed, if
at all, by countries of residence or by countries of source is less clear. Under consumption-
based taxes, these returns are not taxed at all." Id.
295 Id at 145.
296 The Structure and Reform of Direct Taxation, Report of a Committee Chaired by Pro-
fessor J.E. Meade; The Institute for Fiscal Studies (1978).
297 Id. at 230-31.
291 Id. at 233.
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 22:161 (2002)
ceived as income and interest paid as deductible, captures this difference.
Since this difference is more attributable to services than the return on capi-
tal, it is an appropriate amount for a consumption tax base. For non-
financial intermediates, either the R or R + F type captures economic rents.
An expenditure tax system does not tax the normal returns from capital
because the deduction of all capital expenditures is the economic equivalent
of exempting the normal return from capital. Thus, an expenditure tax sys-
tem taxes the super normal returns of an activity in the host. This makes
practical sense as the tax captures the host's appropriate source tax base and
is likely to result in substantial revenue because businesses locating in for-
eign states will be rent seekers expecting to earn appreciable economic
rents.
Thus, expenditure tax systems duplicate an income tax system that al-
lows deductions for the costs of all factor inputs that are current expenses
and the normal return on all factor inputs that are capital expenditures. This
is because expenditure taxes remove the income from these factor inputs
from the activity located in the host, leaving only economic rent subject to
source tax. Where the enterprise is treated as a separate entity or corpora-
tion, the expenditure tax shifts the income from these factor imports to the
investor whether that person is foreign or domestic. Where the owner of
that input is a domestic person, as it would be if the foreign enterprise
sought debt or equity capital in the local market, the host nation would be
free to tax that return under its own income tax system. Where the owner of
that input is a foreign person, then the investor should normally be exempt
from taxation. The exemption of the income from the capital of the inves-
tor is equivalent to an expenditure tax system. Indeed, it is an R-based sys-
tem under another name. The R system is preferable to an R + F system
because it is simpler and easy to administer, and is also fairer to the tax-
payer engaged in new investments in a country due to time use of money
concerns.
D. Tax Competition Under the Principles of Optimal Taxation
In one sense, CEN and CIN are not helpful concepts in analyzing tax
havens because CIN and CEN are theories for the proper allocation of capi-
tal, and havens and other conduit regimes do not affect the real allocation of
capital worldwide, though they may facilitate its flow.2 99 Present sourcing
rules, however, have encouraged the nominal location of capital in low-tax
regimes. Optimal taxation, however, changes the analysis of tax competi-
tion dramatically.
299 TANZI, supra note 1, at 137.
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The tax-induced activity of OFCs and of regimes offering inducements
to conduit activities do little to add to the world's store of value.300 Yet un-
der the systems of international tax in place today, an inordinate amount of
income is allocated to these countries. As long as that is the case, tax com-
petition and havens will thrive at the expense of value exporters. Applying
optimal international tax principles, the only base for source taxation should
be value-added. Thus, host regimes that do not tax the income of non-
residents from capital in all of its forms are not in error because they are
simply foregoing a tax base that they really are not entitled to. Neither ha-
vens nor any other host country has a meritorious case for the taxation of
non-resident capital income.
Countries are only entitled to the taxation of economic rent generated
by foreign enterprises. Limiting the taxation of OFC financial activity and
conduit activities solely to economic rents would probably leave little, if
anything, in OFCs' tax base. Thus, the little income tax that OFCs collect
may be greatly disproportionate to that which they are really entitled to.
The problem is not that OFCs tax insufficiently, but that some likely tax too
much, and capital-exporting countries, through the foreign tax credit, subsi-
dize such tax on TNCs and FPI. 301
The problem of tax competition has another dimension. The prefer-
ences just discussed deal with the nominal as opposed to the real location of
significant economic activity. Some providers of physical activity requiring
the use of capital, as in the case of manufacturing or service providers may
locate in a country with tax rates lower than the home state. I
The effect of this under optimal international tax is as follows. Taxa-
tion of the income from all exported factors of production would belong to
the home state; only economic rent would be subject to the host's jurisdic-
tion. Were conditions such that the host provided an enhanced opportunity
for a greater return than the home country, the factors of production would
flow there whether or not the rates of tax were lower. Thus, the lower rates
work to the advantage of the enterprise and, thus, to the advantage of the
capital owners in the home state.
Where economic rents could not be earned in the host by the home en-
terprise, it would simply not invest there. This is unlike the world today
where lower tax rates inefficiently entice the home's capital abroad.
Tax competition could still be a factor even under optimal international
tax in the case of hosts vying for highly mobile activities, like distribution
300 Normally, hosts benefit from imported capital with an increase in income from that
capital. See text at note 195, supra. In many cases, havens only benefit from an increase in
the income from labor. That is due to the fact that the capital is on its way to some place
else, oftentimes, back to the place where it began.
30 A small tax on capital by tax havens is workable where the income is effectively taxed
by home jurisdictions allowing a foreign tax credit. It is not practical where home countries
use an exemption method because capital from these countries will seek out no tax regimes.
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centers, coordination centers and R & D centers which may require a sub-
stantial presence in a host country. If one assumes that more than one suit-
able location offers similar opportunities to earn economic rents, then tax
competition would determine which country becomes the situs. 302
This is not a terribly significant problem when compared with the
problem of tax competition today, which shifts the capital income tax base.
Moreover, by definition, nations will be attracting physical activities that
may impose burdens more in line with the benefits foreign investments
bring. Significant investment will affect one or all of the following: it will
increase the value of the currency, increase the amount of imports and ex-
ports, and increase the cost of labor. These effects can change the com-
petitive position of the host over time. Either nations will not perceive the
tradeoff as worth it and not engage in tax competition, or tax competition
will tend to drive down the tax rates on these activities to zero. Thus,
though optimal international taxation does not completely eliminate tax
competition, it drastically reduces its effect. Only tax harmonization or to-
tally effective residence-based taxation can completely eliminate the effects
of tax competition.
VI. CONCLUSION
Optimal international tax is source taxation, but source reinterpreted
according to the principle of the place where the income-producing value
originates. Only the home has the right to tax income from capital and the
factors of production attributable to its residents. Though this sounds like
resident-based tax, it is actually redesigned source-based tax. The concept
of residence is only relevant as an indirect method of finding the value's
origin. Moreover, the effect is not strictly that of resident-based tax because
the host nation has the exclusive right to tax economic rents.
Optimally, the home country could tax income sourced within that
country, which would include exported factor income worldwide. It would
not provide a foreign tax credit as under resident tax principles because the
home would not need to defer to the source; it is the source. Eliminating
the foreign tax credit and taxing only capital income in all of its forms
would eliminate considerable expense and complexity.
The host nation should limit its income taxation to economic rents, al-
lowing a deduction for the normal return on all imported factor inputs. As
has been shown, this is equivalent to a business expenditure or consumption
tax. The implementation of an expenditure tax for host nations would
greatly simplify international taxation.
302 For this reason, Hufbauer advocates that nations should provide favorable tax regimes
for headquarter's activities of TNCs. See HUFBAUER, supra note 6, at 135.
303 See supra text accompanying notes 97-98.
304 See supra text accompanying note 133.
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Nations may not necessarily comply with these conditions, but other
nations should not subsidize the offending nation. Thus, where a host na-
tion chooses to go beyond taxation of economic rents, the home nation will
not provide a foreign tax credit or exemption system and the effect of such a
305tax will ultimately be born by the host economy.
It is important to note that properly assigning tax jurisdiction between
countries does not require an actual exercise of that jurisdiction by host or
home. Indeed, what equitable allocation results in is the empowerment of
each nation with respect to its proper tax base, freeing it to make the deci-
sion that is best for that country. Should a home country choose not to tax
capital income, that decision belongs to it and it alone. Foregoing tax on
capital income would not create any inefficiencies worldwide because
whether capital is taxed or not, tax has been removed as a factor as to
whether capital should be invested at home or abroad, or whether business
activity will take place at home or abroad. The decision to use capital,
technology or any other value abroad will be made on the basis of whether
the foreign system provides an advantage due to its natural endowments,
good government, abundant resources, or skilled and efficient labor. It has
been said that tax competition disappears with resident-based tax.3 °6 Tax
competition also wanes with equitable source-based tax of capital income
by the resident country.
305 This is only precisely true for new investment, which, as long as the investor is in-
formed about the tax, she will pass its incidence on to the borrower. Old investment, unless
the possibility of the new tax was anticipated, will lose. See League of Nations, Report on
Double Taxation, supra note 148, at 7.
306 See Wilson, supra note 55, at 282.
